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1990–2014: Special 25th-anniversary issue!

T

his EAP celebrates 25 years of publication.
In early spring, EAP editor David Seamon
sent out invitations to contribute an essay
for a special fall issue. In response, Seamon
received the 19 entries that follow. To accommodate
this issue’s length as a paper copy, we have used a
triple-column, ten-point format. The digital version
remains in the usual two-column, 12-point format.
In his introduction to this anniversary issue, Seamon reproduces the list of potential questions that he
suggested contributors might address (see p. 8).
Though few of the entries answer these questions directly, one notes that they underlie many of the authors’ concerns and serve as pointers toward important matters that may mark the future of environmental and architectural phenomenology.
One of these matters is the impact of digital information, hyperspace, and virtual reality on realworld places, life, and events. This concern affects
EAP immediately, since this will be the last paper
issue—production and especially postage costs have
become too much to bear. As readers know, EAP is
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already available in an open-source digital version.
With the elimination of paper copies, we will no
longer send out a subscription request in fall issues.
In lieu of subscriptions, we ask that readers make a
donation for whatever amount they feel EAP is worth
(see back page), since we still have production expenses.
We thank those readers who have supported
EAP over the last 25 years. At its peak, in the late
1990s, our subscription list reached 150. Since open
access, however, our paid readership has plummeted;
in 2014, we received subscriptions from only 41 individuals and ten academic libraries. Though this
loss in subscribership is discouraging, there is an encouraging side too. Since it became open source,
EAP has been seen by many more readers than paper
copies could generate. For example, (cont. on p. 2)
Below: Booleroo Backyard–Panel 3, 60 x 213cm, 2014. This
painting by artist Sue Michael pictures a backyard in Booleroo
Centre, a small Australian town north of Adelaide. Note how
outside and inside interconnect, a lifeworld feature Michael
discusses in her essay, p. 15. For panels 1 & 2, see p. 17.
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More Donors, 2014

the fall 2014 issue has been viewed more than 1,100
times on the academia.edu website. We are told by
the Kansas State University webmaster in charge of
K-Rex (the digital library holding the EAP archive)
that “hits” to the EAP collection are regularly in the
top ten percent of most downloaded entries. Phenomenological insights may be gaining traction in a way
unimaginable via paper distribution alone!
As some readers remember, EAP was originally
envisioned by philosopher Robert Mugerauer (see
his essay, p. 9), interior-design educator Margaret
Boschetti, and environment-behavior researcher David Seamon at a breakfast meeting at the 1989 Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA)
conference. Boschetti and Seamon took on the task
of co-editing EAP until 2002, when Boschetti retired
and Seamon became editor. Boshetti was unable to
contribute an essay to mark EAP’s anniversary, but
she did send a congratulatory note that makes a fitting end to the start of this special issue. She wrote:

We gratefully thank the following readers who, since
the spring 2014 issue, have contributed more than the
base subscription for 2014: Andrew Cohill, Janet
Donohoe, Ben Jacks, and Harvey Sherman.

Items of Interest
The 18th annual meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) will
be held October 25–27, 2014, in New Orleans. The
conference follows the annual meetings of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Philosophy (SPEP); and the Society for Phenomenology
and the Human Sciences (SPHS). http://environmentalphilosophy.org/; www.spep.org/; http://sphs.info/.

The 45th annual meeting of the Urban Affairs Association (UAA) will be held in Miami, Florida, April
8–11, 2015. The theme of the conference is “The Dynamics of Place Making in the Global City.” The
UAA is dedicated to creating interdisciplinary spaces
for engaging in intellectual and practical discussions
about urban life. http://urbanaffairsassociation.org/.

David,
Congratulations on the 25th anniversary of EAP.
Hard to believe it has been 25 years since you
launched this idea and asked me to be involved. It is
truly a tribute to your commitment to encourage the
expansion of interest and knowledge in environmental phenomenology that this milestone has been
reached. Not only has the publication of EAP supported scholars, both established and new, to explore
and expand their research in this field. It also has introduced voices from neighboring disciplines into the
on-going dialog, thereby enriching the total milieu.
I clearly recall how important it was to my career when I met you at a conference and discovered
a group of like-minded researchers. Phenomenology
not only provided a way to investigate questions of
interest to me. It gave me a home in the academic
community so I could continue to grow and move forward professionally. In that respect, I am like so
many others whom you supported via EAP.
Best wishes going forward as you continue to
support young scholars and mature minds with EAP.

The conference, Philosophy of The City II, will be
held December 4–5, 2014 in Mexico City. Key questions include: What do philosophers have to say
about urban life? Is there a need for a new philosophy
of the city? This conference builds on an earlier conference held in Brooklyn, New York, in 2013. Contact: shane.epting@unt.edu.
The Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology supports research in aesthetics that draws inspiration
from the phenomenological tradition. The journal
provides a platform for innovative ideas that cross
philosophical traditions and traditionally accepted
fields of research in aesthetics. www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bloomsbury/jap.
ARID: A Journal of Desert Art, Design and Ecology
is a peer-reviewed annual publication focusing on
cross-disciplinary explorations of desert arts, design,
culture and the environment for both scholarly and
new audiences. ARID seeks submissions related to
desert regions of the American Southwest and beyond. editors@aridjournal.org.

Fond regards,
Margaret Boschetti, Hot Springs, Arkansas
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Habits and Habituality

“Life lived ‘with blinders on’…”

Philosophers Matt Bower and Emanuele Carminada have edited a special 2014 issue of Phenomenology and Mind, which focuses on “Mind, Habits,
and Social Reality.” The 14 articles examine “habit,
especially its personal and interpersonal aspects.”
Contributors include: Dermot Moran (“The Ego as
Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Habitual Self”); Maxine SheetsJohnson (“On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of
Habit”); and Nick Crossley (“The Concept of Habit
and the Regularities of Social Structure”). The issue
ends with a bibliography of work relating to habit.
As a tribute to phenomenology founder Edmund Husserl, we present, in the side bar, right, Moran’s opening description of Husserl’s understanding
of habit and habituality. The journal is available at:
http://www.phenomenologyandmind.eu/.

Central to Husserl’s analyses [of habit] is his understanding of habitual life in the familiar world. This is
always a life where meanings are encountered or
lived through as “always already there” or “pregiven.” The everyday world of experience has a deep
degree of stability, commonality, normality, familiarity, and even comfort. It is the common context and
horizon for our collective concerns…. Precisely because everyday life has a pre-given, taken-forgranted character, it is invisible in the analyses of the
positive sciences. The operations of this hidden intentionality need to be made visible, and Husserl gradually realized this required a major suspension of our
naïve worldly-commitment, or belief-in-being.
For Husserl, everyday life is natural life, life in
the natural attitude. This is a life lived in obscurity,
the unexamined life, life lived according to everyday
habituality, life lived “with blinders on” as Husserl
often says.
Husserl’s phenomenology of habitual life discovers habit as present at all levels of human behavior from the lower unconscious instincts and drives
(that have their own peculiar individuality or idiosyncrasy) to bodily motility right up to the level of autonomous rational life in culture. Thus he speaks not
just of bodily habits or traits of character but of peculiar and abiding “habits of thought.” These habits of
thought include scientific habits of thinking accepted
without question and that it is the function of the
transcendental epoché to disrupt and thereby expose.
The life of habit… is not just a matter of intellectual attitude or conviction. It can also be a matter of
perceptual tendencies, desires, feelings, emotions,
even peculiar moods. Husserl recognizes the complex
character of our “feelings,” as well as our intertwined
emotional and affective “states,” acts of empathy,
sympathy love, fellow feeling, and so on, as well as
acts of willing (important for our ethical lives). In
this sense, personal love, for Husserl, is described as
a “lasting habitus.” All of these can have a habitual
character, a particular style of being lived through,
and as a result they can be sedimented into layers that
encrust the psyche and form the “abiding style of the
ego” (Dermot Moran, pp. 28–29).

Max van Manen’s New Book
Max van Manen, 2014. Phenomenology of
Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods in Phenomenological Research and Writing. Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press.
Throughout his academic career, educator Max van
Manen has been one of the most accessible commentators on phenomenological method. His Researching Human Experience (1990) is one of the most frequently recommended introductions for newcomers
to phenomenological and hermeneutic research.
No doubt, Phenomenology of Practice will
come to hold an equal place because it is a masterly
account of the nature of phenomenology and the
lived experience of doing phenomenological research. Van Manen begins by delineating the nature
of phenomenological investigation broadly and then
provides a five-chapter overview of key phenomenological founders and practitioners, including current,
cutting-edge thinkers like Michel Serres, Jean-Luc
Nancy, and Jean-Luc Marion.
In the second, longer portion of the volume, van
Manen delineates three key aspects of the phenomenological process: first, the phenomenological epoché—setting aside assumed points of view and see-
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ing the phenomenon afresh; second, the phenomenological reduction—finding ways to locate the essential qualities of the phenomenon; and, third, phenomenological writing—the effort whereby phenomenologists transform their sightings and understandings of the phenomenon into accurate, robust descriptions, particularly “the noncognitive, ineffable,
and pathic aspects of meaning that belong to the phenomenon” (p. 240). The sidebar, below and right,
presents a short portion of van Manen’s discussion of
wonder, epoché, and reduction. In a future EAP, we
hope to include reviews of van Manen's book because it is a major contribution to phenomenology.

 Phenomenological reduction and analysis occur primarily in the attitude of the epoché, the
reduction, and the vocative… (pp. 26–27).

Epoché and Reduction
How can phenomenology gain access to the prereflective experiences as they occur in the taken-forgranted spheres of our everyday lifeworld? Normally we rarely reflect on the lived sensibilities of
our experiences, since we already experience the
meanings immanent in our everyday practices
through our bodies, language, habits, things, social
interactions, and physical environments.
Phenomenology is the method to break through
this taken-for-grantedness and to get to the meaning structures of our experiences. This basic
method is called the reduction. The reduction consists of two methodical opposing moves that complement each other. Negatively it suspends or removes what obstructs access to the phenomenon—this move is called the epoché or bracketing.
And positively it returns, leads back to the mode
of appearing of the phenomenon—this move is
called the reduction…. (p. 215).

Phenomenology and Wonder
Phenomenological method is driven by a pathos:
being swept up in a spell of wonder about phenomena as they appear, show, present, or give themselves to us. In the encounter with the things and
events of the world, phenomenology directs its
gaze toward the regions where meanings and understandings originate, well up, and percolate
through the porous membranes of past sedimentations—then infuse, permeate, infect, touch, stir us,
and exercise a formative and affective effect on
our being…. To say it more pointedly:

The epoché describes the ways that we need to
open ourselves to the world as we experience it
and free ourselves from presuppositions The reduction is generally the methodological term that
describes the phenomenological gesture that permits us to rediscover what Merleau-Ponty (1962)
calls “the spontaneous surge of the lifeworld” and
the way that the phenomena give and show themselves in their uniqueness. The aim of the reduction is to re-achieve a direct and primitive contact
with the world as we experience it or as it shows
itself—rather than as we conceptualize it. But we
need to realize as well that in some sense nothing
is “simply given.” The phenomenological attitude
is sustained by wonder, attentiveness, and a desire
for meaning…. [T]he reduction aims at removing
any barriers, assumptions, suppositions, projections, and linguisticalities that prevent the phenomena and events of the lifeworld to appear or
show themselves as they give themselves. So we
need to engage in the reduction in order to let that
which gives itself show itself (p. 220 and p. 221).

 Phenomenological research begins with wonder at what gives itself and how something
gives itself. It can only be pursued while surrendering to a state of wonder.
 A phenomenological question explores what is
given in moments of prereflective, prepredicative experience—experiences as we live
through them.
 Phenomenology aims to grasp the exclusively
singular aspects (identity/essence/otherness)
of a phenomenon or event.
 The epoché (bracketing) and the reduction
proper are the two most critical components of
the various forms of the reductions—though
the reduction itself is understood quite differently, at times incommensurably, and sometimes contested by various leading philosophers and phenomenologists.
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Human-Immersion-in-World
Twenty-Five Years of EAP
David Seamon, Editor, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology

T

he last longer-than-usual issue of EAP was
produced for its 20th anniversary in 2009. In
that issue, I published essays by four major
figures in environmental and architectural
phenomenology—psychologist Bernd Jager, geographer Edward Relph, and philosophers Karsten Harries
and Jeff Malpas. In my introduction [1], I highlighted
three “recurring concerns” that grounded the aims and
contents of EAP:

and eventually received the 19 essays published here. In
my letter of invitation, I explained that my aim was to
“produce a special fall issue marking a quarter century
of phenomenological work relating to environmental
and architectural concerns.” I included a list of possible
questions that contributors might wish to address (the
list follows this introduction on p. 8). I emphasized,
however, that, “if there are some other relevant questions or themes more important to you currently, then
please focus on those.”
In studying the 19 essays, one notes that most contributors did not respond to my questions directly but,
instead, focused on other themes and situations, all of
which still relate to EAP and indicate important directions that future work in environmental and architectural phenomenology might take. Robert Mugerauer’s
opening essay is a helpful historical overview of “environmental and architectural phenomenology,” particularly its disciplinary and professional dimensions.
In pondering the arrangement of the other 18 essays, I decided to organize them thematically. The first
five essays—by psychologist Eva-Maria Simms, artist
Sue Michael, and philosophers Jeff Malpas, Bruce
Janz, and Dennis Skocz—deal in various ways with the
theme of place—why it is important phenomenologically; how it might be understood via real-world situations; how human attachment to place might be intensified; and how physical, environmental, and human
qualities contribute to a sense of place.
The next five essays—by anthropologist Tim Ingold, ecologist Mark Riegner, environmental educator
John Cameron, and philosophers Janet Donohoe and
Bryan Bannon—shift focus toward the lived constitution of nature, the natural environment, and the natural
world. A central concern is how, conceptually and practically, we replace the standard modernist division between people and world with a penetrating recognition
that human-being-in-the world always involves aspects
of nature, though these authors disagree considerably as

 First, an emphasis on existential phenomenology—in other
words, the absolute necessity of phenomenological work
grounded in, arising from, and returning to concrete experience and the lived reality of lifeworlds;
 Second, an emphasis on researchers’ openness to the phenomenon and offering it a supportive space in which it presents itself in a way whereby it is what it is most accurately and comprehensively;
 Third, an effort to hold theory and practice together, since a
central phenomenological assumption is that how and what
we understand is how and what we make; therefore, finding
more accurate ways to see, think, and envision should, in turn,
strengthen design, planning, policy, and advocacy.

These concerns remain central to the aims of EAP,
and I don’t wish to discuss them again here. Rather,
in this introduction to the special 25th-anniversary issue, I, first, explain how its format came into being;
and, second, discuss the one theme that has struck me
most strongly in editing this special issue—i.e., the
question of how we accurately understand, describe,
envision, plan, and design for a central phenomenological claim: that human beings are always already
inescapably immersed and entwined in their worlds
that, most of the time, “just happen” without the intervention of anything or anyone.

A

s I considered scenarios for a special anniversary issue, I decided that the most revealing
possibility might be to invite a good number
of individuals associated with “environmental and architectural phenomenology” to contribute a short essay of 500–2,500 words. I sent out some 60 invitations
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ence.” Relph quotes Dardel’s striking claim that geographicality “is not to be looked at but is, rather, an insertion of people into the world….”
Several contributors to this special issue consider
how this people-world interlock might be phrased conceptually. Most directly concerned with this matter is
Malpas, who speaks of “human being as placed being”
and goes so far as to suggest that, because human beings
are always already emplaced, phenomenology might
consider rebranding itself as topology, since “every appearing or presencing is itself a ‘taking place’.”
In different ways, Donohoe and Ingold make a similar point in relation to the constitution of nature as it is
lived. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Donohoe views nature “not as a thing but as a ground of experience itself”—a “world of which we are always already aware.”
Ingold argues that, in speaking of a phenomenology of
the natural world, we conceptually presuppose an artificial division—a separating betweenness—whereby we
fail “to notice how both we and [the beings and things
of nature] go along together in the current of time.”
How, he asks, do we really understand and foster a “togethering” rather than yet another “othering”?
An answer to this question is suggested by other
contributors, though in contrasting ways. For Simms,
Michael, and Cameron, a lived enjoinment with place
entails prolonged, care-grounded engagement, a way of
being with the world that Riegner also points to in his
overview of Goethean science as a sensitive phenomenology of nature. Though he would probably not use Ingold’s phrasing, Malpas finds this “togethering” in the
intimate, inseparable “gathering” of people-in-place. As
he has written so eloquently elsewhere, place is “constituted through a gathering of elements that are themselves mutually defined only through the way in which
they are gathered together within the place they also
constitute” [2].
In considerable contrast, Bannon argues that most
current phenomenologies of human-being-in-the-world
remain caught up in a modernist “subject-object metaphysics.” He suggests that we must move away from
any claims of some essential, always-present lived
structure of people-world. Instead, he emphasizes that
we consider “decentering the human” and recognizing
how ecological systems are always in continual flux.
Bannon intimates that the conventional phenomenological emphasis on order, unity, synthesis, generalization,

to how this lived immersion is to be understood conceptually or to be encountered experientially.
The next three essays—by architectural theorist
Lena Hopsch, philosopher Matthew S. Bower, and
educator Paul Krafel—shift attention toward realworld “applications” of phenomenological principles
and methods—Hopsch, in terms of transit design;
Bower, in terms of lived implications of virtual realities; and Krafel, in terms of a more engaged, animated
pedagogy, including environmental education.
The last five essays highlight broader conceptual
issues such as the subjectivity-objectivity dilemma
(geographer Yi-Fu Tuan); the appropriate relationship between phenomenology and analytic, empirical
science (architect Julio Bermudez); phenomenology
as practiced by non-phenomenologists (geographer
Edward Relph); the relationship between phenomenological understanding and practical application
(philosopher Ingrid Stefanovic); and parallels between real-world and phenomenological pathways
and journeys (phenomenologist Betsy Behnke).
It is particularly appropriate that this special EAP
issue ends with Behnke’s essay, since her invaluable
Study Project in Phenomenology of the Body Newsletter, published from 1988 to 1994, was one of the original inspirations for EAP. In that sense, endings often
resonate with starting points.

I

n studying the 19 essays that follow, one can locate a considerable range of related themes, but I
want to focus on one that lately has returned again
and again to my thinking and writing: the difficult
business of understanding the complex, multivalent
ways in which we, as human beings, are intertwined,
intermeshed, entrenched and submerged in the worlds
in which we find ourselves.
Different phenomenologists have sought to clarify this “lived immersion” variously, with Husserl
emphasizing intentionality, lifeworld, and natural attitude; Heidegger, being-in-world and dwelling; and
Merleau-Ponty, lived embodiment, chiasm, and flesh.
In his essay, Relph reminds us of yet another important effort to phrase this lived immersion: French
historian Eric Dardel’s perspicacious notion of geographicality—“the relationships and experiences that
bind human beings to the earth, which [Dardel] considered to be fundamental aspects of human exist-
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and truth needs reconsideration via more recent poststructuralist, relationalist, and materialist perspectives
that favor indeterminacy, diversity, local narratives,
particularity, and contingent possibilities.

Underlying these four qualities of virtual experience is the more fundamental phenomenological recognition that “Reality encumbers and confines” [7].
Though VR may superficially seem real, it can readily
escape and replace the lived messiness of real lifeworlds
with much more convenient, vivid, or fantastical situations that require no stakes or responsibilities.
On one hand, virtual reality holds remarkable
promise in that it could be a huge contributor to repairing a good number of the world’s problems. Who, for
example, would need a car if he could simply put on his
virtual headset and “go to” his workplace, grocery store,
or favorite recreation place? Or who needs an elaborate
house (or vacation, hobby, or fun night out) when all
these “experiences” and “places” might be less costly
generated vicariously and virtually?
On the other hand, virtual reality involves potential
risks and dangers, including time wasting, titillation, addiction, and withdrawal from most things real. Why
make the efforts that an encumbering, confining real
world entails when virtual reality can provide ease,
pleasure, and enhanced vividness without the downside
of demands, exertions, obligations, or consequences?
I highlight virtual reality because, as Borgmann and
Bower’s work indicates, phenomenological perspectives can offer singular insights as to VR’s possibilities
and implications. Lifeworld, natural attitude, intentionality, horizon, body-subject, embodied emplacement,
lived place, and other key phenomenological notions all
identify integral constituents of any human experience,
whether real or virtual. Human beings are always already soldered in and to their worlds, even if the soldering may be virtual. Understanding this soldering, in its
myriad lived aspects, remains a central aim of EAP and
environmental and architectural phenomenology.

F

or me personally, the entry most intriguing is
Matthew Bower’s discussion of virtual reality,
which he sees as progressively “part and parcel
of the naïve everydayness of life” and entering “into
relation with all other nodes of our perceptual field,
modifying the nature of the whole.”
As some EAP readers no doubt know, virtual reality (VR) has recently made a quantum leap via 22year-old inventor Palmer Lucky’s headset device
called the Oculus Rift, bought by Facebook in March,
2014, for two billion dollars. This digital machine is
the first to generate fully what VR programmers call
presence—a deep, unquestioned sense one is somewhere else, for example, a simulation of a craggy,
rocky mountainside that seems so real that you really
think you could fall into the deep chasm below [3].
On one hand, Bower’s claims for the future of VR
are hopeful in that “we can find a virtuality that is not
set over and against the real” but extends reality and
enhances virtually what reality was before VR. On the
other hand, there is the phenomenological work of
philosopher Albert Borgmann, who is less sanguine
because of the lived ways that virtual reality can facilitate experiences that might seem real but could never
fully unfold in real reality or actual lifeworlds [4].
Borgmann identifies four lived qualities that trigger
enhancements, distortions, or reductions of what “experience” often becomes in virtual reality:
 Pliability: the way that virtual objects and experiences can
be “entirely subject[ed] to…desire and manipulation” [5];
 Discontinuity: the way that virtual objects and experiences
need not have any practical connection or lived relationship
with the real-world situation in the midst of which the virtual
user is still immersed even as he partakes in virtual reality;
 Brilliance: The way that virtual reality can intensify an experience’s attractive features and reduce or eliminate entirely its unpleasant, uninteresting, or irrelevant dimensions;
the “truly brilliant reality,” writes Borghman, “would exclude all unwanted information” [6];
 Disposability: The way that virtual users can end the virtual
experience at any time and feel no responsibility or obligation to the “events” and “experiences” of the virtual reality
they have just left; in this sense, virtual reality is readily dismissible and disposable.

Notes
1. D. Seamon, Twenty Years of EAP, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology 20, 3 (fall 2009): 3–5.
2. J. Malpas, Heidegger's Topology, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p.
29.
3. L. Grossman, Head Trip, Time Magazine, Apr. 7, 2014, pp. 36–41;
P. Rubin, Oculus Rift, Wired, June, 2014, pp. 78–95.
4. A. Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 87–102; also see A. Borgmann,
Holding on to Reality, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999.
5. Borgmann, Crossing, p. 88.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 96.
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Possible Questions for the 25th - Anniversary Issue of EAP (see p. 5)
Questions relating to phenomenology
and related interpretive approaches
and methods:
 What is phenomenology and what does
it offer to whom?
 What is the state of phenomenological
research today? What are your hopes
and concerns regarding phenomenology?
 Does phenomenology continue to have
relevance in examining human experience in relation to world?
 Are there various conceptual and methodological modes of phenomenology
and, if so, how can they be categorized
and described?
 Has phenomenological research been
superseded by other conceptual approaches—e.g., post-structuralism, social-constructionism, relationalist and
non-representational perspectives, the
various conceptual “turns,” and so
forth?
 Can phenomenology contribute to making a better world? If so, what are the
most crucial phenomena and topics to
be explored phenomenologically?
 Can phenomenological research offer
practical results in terms of design,
planning, policy, and advocacy?
 How might phenomenological insights
be broadcast in non-typical academic
ways—e.g., through artistic expression,
theatrical presentation, digital evocation, virtual realities, and so forth?
 What are the most important aims for
future phenomenological research?
 Do the various post-structural and social-constructionist criticisms of phenomenology—that it is essentialist,
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist,
ignorant of power structures, and so
forth—point toward its demise?
Questions relating to the natural
world and environmental and ecological concerns:
 Can there be a phenomenology of nature and the natural world?
 What can phenomenology offer the intensifying environmental and ecological
crises we face today?
 Can phenomenology contribute to more
sustainable actions and worlds?
 Can one speak of a sustainable lifeworld?
 What is a phenomenology of a lived environmental ethic and who are the key
contributors?





Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a
role in caring for the natural world? For
places? For lifeworlds broadly?
Can phenomenology contribute to environmental education? If so, in what
ways?
Can there be a phenomenology of the
two laws of thermodynamics, especially
the second law claiming that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities? Are there ways whereby phenomenological understanding of lifeworld might help to reduce the accelerating disordering of natural and human
worlds?

Questions relating to place, place experience, and place meaning:
 Why has the topic of place become an
important phenomenological topic?
 Can a phenomenological understanding
of place contribute to better place making?
 Can phenomenology contribute to a
generative understanding of place and
place making?
 What roles do bodily regularity and habitual inertia play in the constitution of
place and place experience?
 What are the lived relationships between place, sustainability, and a responsive environmental ethic?
 How are phenomenological accounts to
respond to post-structural interpretations of space and place as rhizomic and
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)?
 Can phenomenological accounts incorporate a “progressive sense of place”
argued for by critical theorists like
Doreen Massey?
 Can phenomenological explications of
space and place account for human differences—gender, sexuality, lessabledness, social class, cultural background, and so forth?
 Can phenomenology contribute to the
politics and ideology of place?
 Can a phenomenological understanding
of lived embodiment and habitual inertia be drawn upon to facilitate robust
places and to generate mutual support
and understanding among places, especially places that are considerably different (e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or regions)?
 Can phenomenology contribute to mobility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic
spaces, the places of mobility, non-

spaces and their relationship to mobility
and movement?
Questions relating to architecture and
environmental design and policy:
 Can there be a phenomenology of architecture and architectural experience and
meaning?
 Can phenomenology contribute to better architectural design?
 How do qualities of the designable
world—spatiality, materiality, lived
aesthetics, environmental embodiment
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds?
 What are the most pertinent environmental and architectural features contributing to a lifeworld’s being one way
rather than another?
 What role will cyberspace and digital
technologies have in 21st-century lifeworlds? How will they play a role in
shaping designed environments, particularly architecture?
 What impact will digital advances and
virtual realities have on physical embodiment, architectural design, and
real-world places? Will virtual reality
eventually be able to simulate “real reality” entirely? If so, how does such a
development transform the nature of
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and architecture?
 Can virtual worlds become so “real”
that they are lived as “real” worlds?
Other potential questions:
 What is the lived relationship between
people and the worlds in which they
find themselves?
 Can lifeworlds be made to happen selfconsciously? If so, how? Through what
individual efforts? Through what group
efforts?
 Can a phenomenological education in
lifeworld, place, and environmental embodiment assist citizens and professionals in better understand the workings
and needs of real-world places and
thereby contribute to their envisioning
and making?
 Is it possible to speak of human-rightsin-place or place justice? If so, would
such a possibility move attention and
supportive efforts toward improving the
places in which people and other living
beings find themselves, rather than focusing only on the rights and needs of
individuals and groups without consideration of their place context?
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T

E

AP is celebrating its 25th year of successfully
accomplishing a central task: working as a
site for phenomenologically exploring our
lifeworld. In doing so, it has exemplified the
core dimensions of both the phenomena and the approach: focusing on our lives together in our environmental and architectural realms and on the ways we
come to understanding as part of a social, communal
project. EAP has insightfully shown us what is given
but too often overlooked because we are caught up in
the midst of what we are doing. Lifeworld meanings,
in other words, are normally experienced implicitly
and not unfolded explicitly.
As a result of attending to EAP’s gift—evoking
meanings and values that enrich our lives—many of
us, whether specifically working phenomenologically
or with related qualitative strategies, have found ourselves called to participate in dialogue and to respond
with research, design, and education.
What strikes me most in looking back over past
EAP issues is the atmosphere of openness and freedom
that prevails in the course of presenting fresh insights
and substantive content. The project never was to form
a closed circle of researchers, professionals, or inquisitive readers. Rather, a better image might be genuinely international networks with many different sorts
of linkages among members or of orbiting activities
intersecting here and there. That is to say, EAP is all
about people with a certain attitude or style as much
as it is about the environmental and architectural subject matter. David Seamon and Margaret Boschetti deserve full credit for helping so many of us along the
journey.

hink of how the story of the last 25 years is a
gathering and scattering of participants who do
not form anything like a movement but, rather,
facilitate a series of movable rendezvous. Indeed, part
of the richness of what has happened is that many particular “tribes” actually have little contact with each
other, or have in common a few individuals who are
related with what are known as weak rather than strong
ties.
In the beginning, there were “humanistic” geographers attending to place: Yi-Fu Tuan, Anne
Buttimer, Ted Relph, and a young David Seamon. A
few theorists and philosophers such as Christian Norberg-Schulz, Karsten Harries, and a young Bob
Mugerauer were attending to architecture. These
thinkers, however, were not connected at first. For example, I was happy but embarrassed to learn at a 1983
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy conference in St. Louis that Harries, beyond his
general work in aesthetics, had developed a sub-specialty of Rococo churches.
So off went the venture into uncharted territory.
Not surprisingly—though pleasantly surprising to us
in each instance—we did not “discover” other people,
since they were already there doing good work. But we
did discover what they were doing and ways to connect more and more of us. The basic move was to find
venues for getting together, the master of which was
Seamon, already performing the role he still does, formalized in EAP.

T

he main problem was finding parent organizations whose conferences were not so overly
positivistic as to exclude other approaches.
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Most of these venues were disciplinary, but an increasing number of multi-disciplinary, environmentally or
architecturally focused organizations also appeared.
There were sessions for several years at the American
Association of Geographers (AAG), especially in the
1980s. There was also teasing open a time and place
as part of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS) meetings, beginning in the early
1980s and still continuing, as well as the hospitable International Human Science Research Conference
(IHSRC).
Somewhat more problematic (because in the heart
of the beast), there have been a long series of presentations at the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) from the mid-1980s. EDRA still provides a venue today, though some of us no longer attend because, in many ways, a hackneyed positivist
critique still dominates (EDRA was where I first met
Ingrid Stefanovic and where the intrepid Seamon still
carries on). The International Association of PersonEnvironment Studies (IAPS), the European counterpart to EDRA (and more receptive to phenomenology
with colleagues such as Gilles Barbey) was a good
venue in the mid-1980s and following.
Architectural, urban, and design-oriented work
was regularly presented at the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture (ACSA) conferences
from the mid-1980s onward and less often at the meetings of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP). Meanwhile, the blossoming field of architectural anthropology was hospitable as seen in
presentations at the Built Form and Culture conferences in the 1980s and the International Association
for the Study of Traditional Environments (IASTE)
from 1990 to the present.
Philosophers independently carried on, in large
part because of the growing interest in environmental
issues and regular presentations at the philosophical
“mother ship” of SPEP in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In the early 2000s, another sub-set of continentally-oriented researchers founded the International
Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP),
which continues to hold its meetings in conjunction
with SPEP and SPHS.

Many phenomenologists, purged from philosophy
departments by analytic philosophy in the 1970s, had
found other arenas in which to operate, including comparative literature. The International Association for
Philosophy and Literature (IAPL) has been a two-decades-long site of exchange since the 1990s. Finally,
there have been many “one of a kind” meetings focusing on topics such as place, spirituality, technology,
sustainability, ecology, landscape, regional studies,
and urbanism.

A

s I noted earlier, what is especially striking is
that, while there are some people active in
multiple arenas, almost no one participates in
all. Indeed, even in the complex networks elaborated
in the various conferences and meetings, not everyone
crossed paths. There are many individuals and clusters
with distinct trajectories, aware of each other but not
focally working together. To note just a few, and here
necessarily leave many others out (the remedy for
which is the terrific now-digital EAP archive!) I still
have not met face to face with Jeff Malpas, Michael
Jackson, or James Weiner, have only intersected once
with Dalibor Vesely, though with Juhani Pallasmaa
and Alberto Pérez-Gómez more often, and with Tim
Ingold only last year.
My point in all this attention to meetings is that
environmental and architectural phenomenology is associated with a diverse, only loosely connected, group
of interesting people. One result is a richness that
comes from diversity and occasional cross-fertilization. That is the real story. Yes, content matters, but it
proceeds from looking, thinking, and talking together
about our shared world. While new people continuously have found one or another via ongoing activities
and publications, what would have been much more
random with many missed connections has been focused and facilitated by EAP.
It is not too much to say that the welcoming attitude prevailing among the people involved and promulgated by EAP has been a major force for good.
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A

lthough I am certainly not opposed to a
phenomenological characterization, I think
of my own work as, for the most part, “topological” or “topographical” rather than
“phenomenological.” Yet I also take phenomenology,
along with hermeneutics, to be essentially topological
in character, a point I have argued for elsewhere (e.g.,
Place and Experience, 1999). It is precisely this topological character that seems to me to underpin the connections between architecture, environment, and phenomenology that EAP has been concerned to explore
and articulate over the past 25 years.
One problem with some contemporary phenomenology, however, is that it seems to lose sight of this
topological orientation (and so also to lose sight of its
properly transcendental character). In fact, the continuing contemporary significance of phenomenology
seems to me to reside neither in its cognitive scientific
relevance nor in its possible connection with aspects
of analytic thought, but rather in the way that issues of
place and environment arise as central to phenomenological inquiry, even if they are sometimes obscured
within it. This is also why phenomenology remains
important to my own work, in spite of my ambivalence
about whether that work is itself to be understood as
primarily phenomenological in character.

proper topos of the phenomena—the topos of appearing or presencing.
The significance of such a topos is not affected by
shifts in the character of place and space that supposedly characterize contemporary globalized modernity.
We can say that even globalized modernity appears
only in and through specific topoi—globalization is
something that occurs only in and through particular
places, in respect of specific things, localities, and
practices. Understanding globalization thus requires
an understanding of place—and this is all the more so,
given the way in which one of the characteristic features of globalization (and of technological modernity
more generally) is to obscure its own placed character.
In this respect, too much of the contemporary discourse around globalization and modernity, even supposedly “critical” discourse, fails to engage with the
real character of modernity, since the conceptual
framework it employs (typically that of unbounded
flow and connection) is precisely the framework of
modernity's own self-representation—and so also the
self-representation of contemporary corporate capitalism and bureaucratic-technocratic governance.

T

he topos of the phenomena is a topos in which
we are always involved. As such, the inquiry
into topos, the turn back to place, is also a turn
back to ourselves. It is, I would say, a turn back to the
human (although a turn that also puts the human in
question—puts ourselves in question). The mode of
being that is the human is most succinctly characterized as that mode of being that is always turned toward
topos—even when it seems to be turned away.
Human being is thus placed being. This is especially important both for architectural and environmental thinking, since it is our own embeddedness in

I

f phenomenology is described as that mode of
philosophical inquiry directed primarily at an understanding of “phenomena”—at an understanding of “what appears” or “is present”—then its topological orientation is already evident in the fact that
every appearing or presencing is itself a “taking
place.” It is this “taking place,” which is bounded as
well as open and dynamic, that grounds the idea of topology as philosophical. Such “taking place” is the
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place and the embeddedness of place in us that underpins and ought to guide environmental care and concern as well as architectural design and practice.
Greater environmental attentiveness is likely to be
achieved only through greater attentiveness to our own
human being—which here means our being in and
through place—and the same holds for good architectural and design practice (which is also why so much
contemporary architecture falls short as architecture).
Moreover, in emphasizing the environmental here as
tied to place, what is also emphasized is a conception
of the environmental that itself encompasses the architectural (as the architectural itself overlaps with the environmental).
On such a topological or topographic conception,
the environmental is not merely that which pertains to
the “natural” or the “unbuilt” (to that which is other
than the human), nor is the architectural about only the
“cultural” or the “built,” but instead both refer us to
the entirety of the surrounding world as it is brought to
focus in place, and that therefore includes the built and
the unbuilt, the cultural and the natural, the urban and
the wild.
In this way, the genuinely interconnected and interdependent character of the world is brought into focus as an interconnectedness and interdependence that
is both encompassing and yet also concentrated; that
is complex and multiple and yet comes to salience in
the singularity of place.

Such a task requires a mode of phenomenology
that speaks to the phenomena in their immediacy, their
singularity—and in their everydayness. Such a phenomenology would be a phenomenology of the everyday, but also a phenomenology attuned to the place of
the everyday and the everydayness of place. To some
extent, it is a phenomenology already present, though
less in the pages of Husserl and Heidegger than in the
articulation of the placed character of experience that
is to be found in much contemporary architecture, art,
music, film and literature, as well as in many forms of
personal reflection and practice.
Perhaps the turn toward a more explicitly topological sensibility, even in conjunction with phenomenology, also requires a turn toward a closer engagement
with ordinary life as well as popular culture—to an understanding of topos in its most prosaic forms as that
out of which any more developed engagement, including with environmental questions, must arise.

T

his understanding of phenomenology is also
one that brings with it a fundamental concern
with the ethical—where ethics is itself already
oriented toward the question of our placed being in the
world. Here place brings together the ethical with the
ontological, so that the two are seen as properly and
inextricably bound together.
Our being placed does not merely determine our
being, it is our being, and as such it is also that which
is the foundation for our being as ethical—it is in being placed that we are given over to the question of our
proper relation to ourselves, to others, and to the
world.
It is thus that environmental concern, as a concern
with the world and our relation to it as that is articulated in and through place and places, itself arises as a
concern that is both ethical and ontological. Such a
concern has been clearly evident through the pages of
EAP. Thanks, as well as congratulations to David Seamon and to EAP on 25 years of sustained engagement
with the issues at stake here—25 years of sustained engagement with phenomenology, with environment,
with architecture, and with place.

R

ecognizing the topological character of phenomenology means recognizing its environmental and architectural relevance, and yet this
may also be thought to bring with it a need to rethink
the character of phenomenology. Although it does not
do away with phenomenology as a mode of philosophical analysis and description, it suggests that phenomenology has an additional task that is directed toward
the uncovering and articulation of our everyday involvement in the world, as that involvement occurs in
and through the places in which our lives are embedded, and as it brings those places, and the wider environmental context, with all its complexities and interdependencies, to light.
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F

rom ten until I was twenty-eight years old, I
spent none of my birthdays at home. August
was always the time for travel: my tenth birthday, in a tent at a girl scout summer camp; my
eleventh, in a convalescent home; my thirteenth, free
and unsupervised in Salzburg; my fifteenth, accompanying an elderly great aunt to Wales; my seventeenth,
as a maid in a dilapidated hotel on a North Sea island;
my eighteenth, in London; my nineteenth, in Prague;
my twentieth, high up in the Alps; my twenty-first, a
Sunday a few days after arriving as a graduate student
in Dallas, Texas; my twenty-second, at a wedding in
Paolo Alto; and so on.
I left my home in Germany to have my American
adventure—without knowing I would never return to
live in Germany, apart from visiting my parents a few
weeks most summers. When I was a young woman, it
seemed to be a sign of my destiny that I awoke on that
special day every year in another place, with other people, and without a birthday party. It made Salzburg,
London, and Prague special. To touch the hearts of
those places, I made sure I took my solitary “birthday
walk” on beaches or through
the mazes of city streets.
My husband Michael
and I moved to a house on
Mt. Washington after we
came to Pittsburgh. “We
have travelled far on this
mountain,” he wrote in a
poem for me after our son
was born. Over the past 25
years, that line has captured
for me a different way of
travelling. We have lived on
the same mountain since

1987. We have walked the same streets, have seen
children grow up, witnessed funeral processions, saw
old houses fall and new ones built, and have looked
out over the Monongahela Valley too many times to
count.

I

still travel to Europe every year, but the direction
of my journey has gradually changed. It all began
with birds. Our back porch had a canvas awning
pulled up in winter, and every spring a pair of rosy
house finches nested in the folds. A pair of mourning
doves has been recycling a nest on the ledge above our
back door for more than a decade, and they are probably by now the offspring of the offspring. I have to
make sure every year that we do not use the porch too
early in the season because, as soon as the door opens,
the mama bird goes whoosh and flies away in panic.
Every year the same visitors: They come and stay for
a few weeks, their babies fledge, and they move on to
other places when the season ends.
Birds, I noticed, don’t just fly around all the time.
They make their home in one place, and they live there
for the season, just like we
do. They share this place
above the Monongahela
River with us. They are our
neighbors, which means
that they are our nah-gibur
(Old High German), our
“near-dwellers.”
I began to notice other
birds returning over the
years: the chimney swifts
who come in May; the
magnolia warblers, who
pass through around the
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same time; the scarlet tanagers, who flash through the
woods in June. Early May is the best time, because,
through the still sparse leaves, you can see the ruby
crowned kinglets in the thickets. My favorite neighbors, the coopers’ hawks, refurbish their nest and engage in their courtship dance.

of leaf mold and concrete, but sometimes you find a
clearing in the woods where the beautiful red sandstone juts from a cliff. Or one notices shiny jet coal
pieces sometimes flung across old trails. The story is
that, during the great depression, people would gather
these coal fragments and burn them in their stoves.
Going deep means to look at the stone and ask:
What is under there? How did it come about? How
strange to notice that all our hills have the same height!
But you learn they are not hills at all: In this part of
Pennsylvania, there are only valleys carved from a
plateau by glacial-melt water during the last ice ages.

M

y daily walks through the neighborhood
streets and woods are now overlaid with a
soundscape of birdsong. I slowly learned to
notice and differentiate the territorial melody of the
wood thrushes or the warning chips of the chickadees.
They don’t seem to mind me—I guess I am nothing
compared to a feral cat or a red-tailed hawk. Slowly,
year after year, I have come to “travel far on this
mountain,” which has become more varied and full.
My travels do not go far away anymore, but they go
deep.
Going deep in a place means to understand its
rhythms and its web of beings: the change of light over
the rivers at dawn, the migration of birds, the first toad
lilies of the spring, the ebb and flow of human and nonhuman beings who are my neighbors. I imagine that
women in hunter-gatherer societies had deep relationships with their places, and they cultivated a particular
knowledge of life in one place. That knowledge was
inscribed into their bones: the legs that walked and the
hands that touched. Their ears understood the cries of
animals; their eyes knew how to see; their hearts welcomed the turning of the seasons, even if they were
cold, wet, and uncomfortable.
As to the stones under us—the bones of the
earth—how rarely do we actually see them here in
Western Pennsylvania! They are hidden under layers

T

rue ecological awareness means to go deep in a
natural place. You begin to understand its fabric or relationships and how it changes in time.
You remember the animal fellows from years back,
and you look forward to their return and the birth of
their babies.
You care for this place because you have walked
it, and it lives in your muscles and bones. You care for
this place because you have seen and scented and
heard it. This place lives in your senses as a differentiated, perceptual landscape. It lives in your memory
and it lives in your thinking because it asks you questions, and you search for answers.
This place lives in your dreams as the landscape
of your soul, and you are here to be its witness. Your
breath is of it and in you, and you give it back. After
the last, your body will be of it, and your soul will pour
itself over the river valleys. You are finally able to read
the braille of the air currents as they carry other winged
friends toward their other homes.

.
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A

ustralian historian and writer Paul Carter
(2010) has explored the spatial history of
Australia and has provided pathways for
me, as an artist, to follow: to meshes of local complexity, the clearly invisible, the breached
commonplace, and story lines that can be traced back
to unheard voices. Carter offers an approach that remains open to negotiation, where the human, non-human, cosmic, and local are all together.
Local South Australian knowledge, now gone,
was collected by Robert Bruce in his 1902 Reminiscences of an Old Squatter [1]. He wrote:
I used to wonder why those rodents [“suahs,” or stick-nest rats]
would heap up a big cartload of sticks in the shape of a haycock,
to roof their nests, when a half a barrowful might have fully met
all requirements… those little chaps always had plenty of company, for whenever I happened to drop a lighted match on the
windward side of their woodheaps I always noticed that in a short
time afterwards a pretty equally mixed assemblage of suahs and
snakes would leave…Those suahs have long since disappeared
from the South Australian settled country (quoted in Barker et al.
1995).

The stick-nest rat’s generous domestic practices,
sharing with other species in an arid climate, have permeated my thoughts as a topos, a schema, particularly
in relation to Mid North snakes’ poisonous venom.
The northern reaches of South Australia’s Mid North
have different geographical conditions from the more
popular local tourist destinations of the Barossa, Clare
Valley, and the Flinders Ranges. Long lines of ancient hills run north to south, sheltering flat plains that
are usually tinder dry in summer. Peppermint box

gums used to cover the undulating land, but these trees
have given way to pastoral leases.
There is very little surface water, and the unpredictable climate brings flash floods, bushfires, snow, fierce
wind, low winter temperatures, and unspeakable summer heat where snow may have rested a few months before. Drought is a major shaping force, and the landscape is dotted with old bores and homestead ruins that
tell of the geographical realities (Williams 1974;
Meinig 1963).
First-nation culture suggests the local landscape
was generous, and the native Ngadjuri people lived successfully in the region before battles over water and land
access began with European pastoralists (Warrior
2005). The Ngadjuri barely survived, after a late nineteenth-century decimation of their numbers and culture
through massacres, disease, and displacement. Their
strong ties to the land, incorporating cosmology, language, and knowledge of local medicinal plants, have
mostly been lost.

M

y European pioneering ancestors had strong
ties to local Ngadjuri, and I believe my family quickly learned to love the region as the
Ngadjuri did. The sanctity of all life and the skills to
make do with what resources were available to adapt to
a harsh life are foundations for my family’s culture, and
I feel this directly links to Mid North geographical influences. A spiritual dimension runs through my visualart research and becomes clearer after each visit to the
area as I learn to interpret perceived yet unseen forces—
voices from my family’s past; and Aboriginality, with
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its alternative intelligence, which has left
traces wherever I go.
If life was difficult
in this region, there still
seems to be a bias for
life and successful
place making. It is a
personal journey I take
with a heuristic approach to research, trying to see settlement
through the eyes of my
great
grandparents:
how they made happy
homes, full of creative
projects, guests, simple comforts, and laughter.
My family’s Mid North imagination was shaped
by isolation, poverty, and a difficult climate, with
death close by. Though few of us stayed on as farmers
and shopkeepers, we learned a beautiful way to relate
to the earth, to animals, and to each other. The land is
still so calming and soothing to be in. I have heard
First Nation people say it is a very powerful land.

F

rom visiting the region now, I still see signs of
a different way of thinking. European settlers
had no clear rules in the early days and had to
make their own sense of place. Even in today’s “modernized” homes, I observe signposts of this different
sort of intelligence: special plants are given indoor
berths or places under the verandah; garden seating
allows enjoyment of the natural environment via numerous orientations; patterns of outside shade continue into house interiors; cupboards and cases are
filled with the gifts from gardens; lounge rooms with
recliners and knee rugs afford sociability, mutual care,
and gathering together via clustering.
These observations parallel what English opera
and theater director Jonathan Miller says of home:
I actually think that the function of a great deal of art should be
to redirect your attention to things you would otherwise overlook. It’s the overlooked, the negligible, the disregarded, the
abandoned and the derelict that is actually where the payload is
(quoted in Cliff 2007).

Miller’s domestic observation points toward a
central premise of my art:
that nature’s powerful presence is felt intensely to “enter” the home. Over time, locals have come to accept the
presence of the landscape,
enjoying small mercies,
adapting and using creative
problem-solving, enhancing
home spaces to have a better
life, without focusing on
fear.
I see this pattern in my
family’s homes and many
other Mid North dwellings. When I peruse online realestate photos from the region, I note how the aesthetics
reflect the surrounding landscape: leaf-litter carpets and
minimal yet atmospheric rooms painted the color of
coral blush to match the soil. Sometimes, an entire
house is painted aqua in a defiant “cooling” gesture.
Dwelling features like these are all positive signs of
a nourishing living in an unforgiving region where you
can die of thirst, if the silence or deadly brown snakes
don’t get to you first. There is so much to think about
from alternative points of view.

Note
1. “Squatter” is a term used for earliest Australian pastoralists who
used land before claims and boundaries were formalized.
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Above: Sue Michael, Booleroo Centre Road, 120 x 150 cm, acrylic
on canvas, 2012; see next page for more work by Michael.
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Sue Michael, Booleroo Backyard—Panel 1, 60 x 267 cm, 2014.

Sue Michael, Booleroo Backyard—Panel 2, 60 x 212 cm, 2014. In an email, Michael describes the elderly woman
who kept this backyard garden: “She often worked all morning and afternoon in her garden, all through the
seasons. Even on unbearably hot days, she could be found pulling weeds from beneath the shrubs. She was from
Booleroo Centre and was 93 years old.”

Left: Sue Michael, Booleroo Kitchen, 20 x 38 cm, 2013. Right: Sue Michael, The New Car, 60 x 130 cm, 2014.
Michael writes: “These simple domestic scenes point to neat, tidy, practical ways, with all that you need close at
hand. The red dust and drought do impinge, but like a sweeping of the floor, life begins anew, in its own time.”
In describing her painting, Booleroo Centre Road (reproduced on p. 16), Michael explains: “Slices of the countryside pass us by in the car. This canvas shows shifts, subtle differences, illuminations and undisclosed storylines.
Like early explorers sketching from under a sailboat canvas, inching along the coastline, I have painted cross
sections of the land that I have travelled since my childhood. This land is ever shifting and yet still feels the same.”
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H

ow better to celebrate the 25th anniversary
of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology than to reflect on the enduring importance of EAP’s aims? We humans are spatial to the core, not so much “lost in
space” as “found in place.” The public spaces in
which we speak and act and the private spaces from
which we emerge and to which we return each day
form the two domains within which and between
which the time of our lives plays out. Space and time
are less Kant’s a priori forms of intuition than they are
that lived unity that everyday speaking calls “taking
place.” Place—public and private—is “built into”
who we are as it is “built up” in our architecture.
My first ambition was to be an architect, and my
dissertation in philosophy was on private property. In
recent courses, I have called upon my classes to think
open-endedly on philosopher Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the ancient Greek distinction of the public
and private as it bears on our lives today as selves and
citizens. It seems that the fate of the public and private
rises and falls in tandem and that, in a trend of longmaking and uncertain outcome, each has become less
distinct. The result is a lived topography more uniform and less human.
I put the following as a hypothesis to EAP readers: Sociology as it developed in the nineteenth century was the expression and product of world-transforming dis-placements brought on by modernity. I
include within the scope of this hypothesis all the
Great Grandfathers of sociology but think now especially of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies and
his distinction of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, often translated as society and community (Tönnies
1887/1957). Tönnies’ rendering of community may
be somewhat romantic, but society, Gesellschaft,

stands first and foremost for the marketspace that developed with capitalism. Tönnies gives us much to think
about in regard to social interaction mediated by markets and the “spacings” that ensue therefrom. In any
case, I invite my colleagues to scan the founding literature of sociology noting how much dis-placing and respacing figures in the thinking of the early sociologies.

L

et me shift now from the marketspace of global
capitalism to the “home front.” Here, I would
propose to EAP readers a thought experiment.
Imagine that you are a well compensated, white-collar
worker or manager or executive or even Wall Street financier—or perhaps best for our purposes, a successful
Willy-Lohman traveling salesman. Every night you
check into a first-class hotel. Your every wish is satisfied by your ability to select your accommodation and
the attentive care provided by the hotel staff and other
workers in the hospitality industry. Architecture and interior design work their magic to create a guest experience with “no (unpleasant) surprises.” Your laundry is
always done for you, beds made, meals prepared and
brought to your room if you like. No need to water the
plants in the room or care for the grounds. Your family
can stay with you. Baby-sitting and pet care are provided.
The one condition in this thought experiment is that
you cannot stay long in any one location. Whatever you
brought with you into a room or suite must leave with
you. You cannot modify your rooms, though of course
you can move to a hotel that better suits your changing
aesthetic requirements. If someone were to ask you
where you might be in three years, you would not be
able to say. The material conditions of existence in this
scenario are intended to rule out any negative judgment
regarding one’s circumstances based on conditions relating to discomfort, pain, fear, intrusion, disruption,
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housekeeping responsibilities, or anger with poor service. Would such an arrangement leave something to
be desired? Would there be a basis for calling any
place in the succession of places one occupies over a
lifetime one’s own—in other than a very temporal
sense? What would be missing for you to say, “This
is my place,” and mean it? And how important would
it be to have whatever it took for you to call a place a
room of your own?
The thought experiment framed here can be seen
phenomenologically as an imaginative variation intended to achieve eidetic insight into the essence of
“owness” or, more specifically, into the nature of a
place one calls one’s own. The bigger, follow-on
question—one I have returned to recurrently since
writing my dissertation—is whether having a place of
one’s own is a constitutive dimension of human being-in-the-world.
Would we be less human without a place to call
our own? Is the reflection initiated above so culturally
embedded that its relevance to other humans elsewhere is questionable? Or is the challenge to ownness
from elsewhere—in this case, a place somewhere else,
someone else’s place—already itself testimony to the
importance of place to our being-in-the-world? Is a
division of places into those we find familiar or
strange testimony to a social landscape zoned by mine
and thine, ours and yours? Is such a social-culturalhistorical environment as much a part of human being-in-world as embodiment and speech?

I

n his list of potential discussion questions for essays in this special twenty-fifth-anniversary issue
of EAP, David Seamon asks whether phenomenology can contribute to a politics and ideology of
place. I think the answer is “yes.” For Virginia Wolf,
a “room of one’s own” meant a place for women in

the world of literature, politics, and ideas. The book of
that title is a manifesto of the feminist movement. Contested spaces are drivers of conflict. Holy lands and
terra sancta enter into secular and political struggle and
warfare. The global phenomenon of migration and refugee movement is a narrative of dis-placement and finding one’s place again in the world.
A few years ago, EAP offered me the opportunity
to suggest how a micro-phenomenology of living in
“climate-controlled” dwellings can shape or distort our
relationship to the natural environment outside (Skocz
2010). Built space can isolate us from the vagaries of
weather and climate or the demands on natural resources required to maintain a comfortable living space.
Our buildings can effect an unconscious and potentially
harmful suspension or epoché not so much from the natural attitude as from nature itself. Conversely, there is,
to answer another of Seamon’s questions, an architecture that makes for better placemaking, one that connects us to our natural surroundings not only aesthetically but also thoughtfully, grounding us in the material
conditions of our existence.
EAP is a record of its readers’ and contributors’ ongoing efforts at “getting into place” and demonstrates
the value of phenomenological reflection toward that
aim. It is itself a place for coming to terms with place,
a home for diverse, imaginative, and timely phenomenology. Let me add my words to congratulate and thank
David Seamon for initiating and sustaining an essential
and continuing dialogue over the 25 years of EAP’s existence.
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M

y partner Lisa is fond of saying that we
go into our academic areas based on
what confuses and bewilders us. She
means this somewhat facetiously when
she thinks about her own area, creative writing, and
adjacent areas such as rhetoric and literature. She suspects her area draws people who are baffled by basic
human communication and coherent narrative.
She’s probably right. I can say that I was drawn
to studying place in part because it baffled me. I grew
up on the Canadian prairies, and Saskatchewan is full
of writers and artists who feel the need to explain the
mystical draw of wide spaces to detractors in the rest
of Canada. There is a strong attachment to place
where I come from, but while I love where I’m from,
I didn’t quite understand why that attachment existed.
It’s not that I couldn’t see the beauty or understand the subtle colors and sounds. I still remember
the smell of the wheat harvest in August and the crispness of hoarfrost in the brilliant winter sun. W. O.
Mitchell’s Who Has Seen The Wind? was read by
every school child, and it both evoked a feature of the
prairies we supposed that only we could understand,
and also the invisibility of that feature. We felt like we
had a secret, privileged knowledge of that place.
And yet, when it came time to go off to university
in Ontario, I didn’t look back. It didn’t get into my
bones the way I saw that it did for others. It was the
new place that I wanted. Was I “differently-abled,”
lacking a place-sense that others possessed, and so
much the poorer for it? Maybe. I went into philosophy, after all, notoriously the discipline least concerned about place, at least classically. Didn’t philosophers rise as quickly as possible to the level of the
universal, and leave all those messy particulars for
other disciplines?

When philosophers did think about place, it was
much like how Hegel thought about “individual”—as a
universal concept that attached itself to all particular
things. Place was like that—everything had one, and
therefore the philosophical task was to consider this
shared feature of all particularities. I suppose my attraction to philosophy should not have been a surprise—in
high school science, I also gravitated toward physics
and away from biology, on the grounds that physics
seemed simpler to me—just equations and laws. Biological entities were messy—every one of them had a
new set of facts to know. Every one of them was particular. Just like places.

W

e know a lot about the philosophy of place
but little about the place of philosophy or, rather, the places of philosophy. We tend to
think that philosophy has no place, that the development
of its concepts is historical accident, which is not, of
course, susceptible to logical analysis and therefore of
little philosophical interest.
This perspective is evident even in policies from
the American Philosophical Association concerning
ethics. There are numerous statements on aspects of philosophy as a profession but few on the ethics of philosophy itself. If we compare the APA statements to other
national academic organizations, such as the American
Anthropological Association, we find that those groups
reflect on the ethics of the methods and practices of anthropologists qua anthropologists, rather than anthropologists qua professionals or university members.
The distinction is important, as it points to an interesting gap within philosophy. Despite supposedly
“owning” the sub-discipline of ethics, it is a study to be
applied largely outside of philosophy itself, rather than
inside. Why? Because ethics is about how we act toward
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people and, in philosophy, there are no people. Of
course, there are people engaged in philosophical activity, but there are no people who are the subject of
philosophy. Concepts are thought to be free-floating,
without owners, without creators or audiences, and
without place. So, the APA does not have a policy on
how those concepts are obtained, or whether there is
some sort of intellectual property entitlement to concepts, or what happens if a concept is let loose on the
world and helps or harms someone.
Given what I’ve said, you might think I’ve arrived home. Someone like me who isn’t sure of his
place attachment has found the one discipline with no
place. And yet, this bothers me immensely. This cannot be right. There must be a blind spot in the history
and practice of philosophy. Nothing is from nowhere.
We aren’t gods, and we shouldn’t pretend that we are.
Philosophy must be in place and be able to credibly
conduct its activity knowing full well that it is in
place, and yet not have the self-reflection on its own
platiality change its activity into something else. The
platiality of philosophy cannot turn it into literature,
or politics, or sociology. But how is this possible?

I

n summer, 1990, I was in Nairobi, Kenya, supporting my soon-to-be spouse in her relief and development work. I visited the philosophy department, and several more times in the subsequent years,
mostly to find out what interested the philosophers in
Kenya. It became clear to me that, while they were
aware of and engaged in the wider world of philosophy, they were also acutely aware of the image that
philosophy in Africa had in the rest of the world.
Not only that. They were aware of the concepts
that they had to address, which had currency in Kenyan society. These were not free-floating concepts,
available to anyone. They were “live” in the sense that
they were taken seriously. Some were very traditional
concepts, such as those tied to witchcraft, ancestor
veneration, and so forth. Even the most hard-nosed rationalists in the department recognized that these concepts had currency in society, even if they wished that
they didn’t. Some were concepts that had a special
significance in Kenya, given their political and social
climate—corruption, democracy, political representation, race. These, of course, are issues in any place,
but they have a particular significance in a place that

has emerged recently from colonialism, and has neo-colonial structures in place. And, there was a discussion of
method—Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka proposed
“sage philosophy,” an approach to African philosophy
that looked for philosophical concepts and arguments
among traditional sages.
And so it became clear that African philosophy was
one site of philosophy that necessarily needed to attend
to its own place. Unfortunately, that has often been understood as carving out a space from a recalcitrant philosophical mainstream and asserting ownership over a
body of material. That’s fine but doesn’t go far. It treats
philosophical space as if it was a map, and there is finite
intellectual property that must be claimed. It was not yet
a focus on philosophical place, the sort that leveraged
existing into new concepts adequate for Kenyan lived
experience. To understand what that would look like,
phenomenology is needed.

P

henomenology, it should be said, has had place
embedded in its bones from the beginning. Husserl, following Brentano, started with intentionality, which enabled him to move from an empirical investigation of the world (largely placeless) to an examination that took seriously the standing and experience
of the perceiver. Even if his goal was universal experience, his starting point was a version of human experience not generalized from the beginning. He had a notion of the horizon, well before Gadamer. The lived
body and its experience in space was central to understanding human experience.
Perhaps most importantly, phenomenology accepted that philosophy had to pay attention to non-philosophy. I do not mean non-philosophy in French philosopher François Laruelle’s sense, which is a broadening of philosophy (Laruelle 2010). I mean that phenomenology takes seriously the question of where philosophy comes from, what its lifeblood is, and what its limits are (or at least what the limits of its concepts are).
Taking experience seriously means that the conduit
from the non-philosophical to the philosophical was in
the reflection on the elements of that experience, not in
some description of the metaphysical structure of the
world, reflection on the mind of God, or deduction from
existing categories and concepts. Phenomenology is
philosophy, but it is also method. That method is per-
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haps the first to allow philosophy to become self-conscious about its place, and about the meaning of place
for thought. It is no longer a philosophy of place, but
philosophy in place, as well as philosophy which, for
the first time, sees place as a condition of thought.

M

any philosophical concepts and methods
have become useful in a wide range of disciplines. Sometimes that use is explicitly
recognized and sometimes, not. Phenomenology has
turned out to be extraordinarily useful in resisting
positivist tendencies of those disciplines to reduce
place to data, as well as the modernist tendency to abstract place into location or coordinates (Janz 2005).
Even as it provides the conversion of non-philosophy
into philosophy, it also allows (for example) anthropologists to move from non-anthropology to anthropology without simply imposing a theoretical structure on the observable world (as happens with modernist forms of anthropology such as functionalism).
We might suppose that the non-philosophy that
philosophy would be interested in would be things
like myth, folk belief, or tradition. We might further
include things like the passions, art, religion in general, and so forth. All of those have been the subject
of philosophical thought, at least to the extent that the
philosophical task has been seen as one of determining demarcation between what can be reasoned about
and what cannot (e.g., Kant)
But there is more than that. The natural world is
non-philosophy, while at the same time, if Deleuze
and others are right (and I suspect they are), it is also
a place that pushes and jogs us into new ways of conceptualizing it. We see the alien nature of the “olfactory poems” of dogs in the misty morning field (to
quote Aldo Leopold) and realize a legibility to the
world that has an effect on us while being at the far
edges of our experience. Place is phenomenology’s attention to the “blooming buzzing confusion” of particularity and its commitment to the notion that the
world is always already meaningful, while at the same
time also strange, opaque, and contradictory.
Phenomenology is not the only philosophical approach that takes seriously the border between nonphilosophy and philosophy. We can find this question
raised in a great many thinkers through the 20th century, in one way or another. It is remarkable, though,

when you start tracing it back, how much even thinkers
fairly hostile to phenomenology are, in fact, indebted to
it. Deleuze, for instance, often seen as diverging significantly from phenomenology, can be seen to be working
out a phenomenological project, at least if Husserl’s
later generative phenomenology is the model (Hughes
2008).
Philosophy, I think, exists wherever you find it. It
is disciplinarily within a set of conversations and questions that stretch back through time and space. But it is
also the process of making sense out of what already is
meaningful for us. We experience place as always already meaningful but also as resisting meaning at the
same time, as having a kind of opacity as well as transparency. There is, after all, non-philosophy. We take
meaningful existence and interrogate it in various ways,
laying bare what is hidden. At the same time, however,
we provide a conduit from non-philosophy to philosophy. Phenomenological investigation exists in both of
those moments, both in the constitution of the world as
meaningful place (including the recognition of the limits of meaning and the presence of non-philosophy) and
then in our reflective ability to interrogate that world.
Perhaps philosophy isn’t as placeless as it first appeared.

S

o I am still out of place. I think I probably always
will be. I live in Orlando Florida, and I keep
thinking of Edward Relph’s idea of “placelessness.” Placelessness, alas, seems all too often to fit this
place—undifferentiated strip malls or the “next big
thing” to provide economic revitalization. Urban decay
and homes where the yard is mowed but where no one
has lived for years, under the theory that, if something
resembles a place, it will continue to be a place.
And yet, my very act of living here, along with
many others, means that this place is intelligible, at least
to me, at the same time as it is mystifying. It is without
question non-philosophy. My colleagues in Kenya have
their version of non-philosophy to grapple with, and I
have mine.
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P

henomenology has traditionally been understood to focus on universal structures of consciousness that make experience possible.
Many thinkers suggest that this perspective
makes nature merely a correlate of consciousness,
thus indicating that nature could not possibly be universal or structural. Other thinkers argue that this understanding of phenomenology embraces an anthropocentric viewpoint that undermines any intrinsic
value of nature.
While these positions may be true on a particular
reading of phenomenology, I would like to suggest
here that a genetic phenomenological account of nature allows us to understand that there is nothing natural about nature and that, in spite of nature’s cultural
embeddedness, there can be universal elements of our
experiences of it. These universal elements can only
be discovered through a genetic phenomenological
account of experience of nature. The genetic account
is characterized by phenomenological philosopher
Edmund Husserl in his later work as an asking back
into the sedimented layers of the natural attitude.
Seen in this way, genetic phenomenology allows
us to peel away layers of cultural sedimentation that
characterize our constitution in the natural attitude, revealing the way in which the facts of the natural attitude are already laden with meaning but also recognizing that there is a fundamental, universal level of
experience of nature that supports those cultural
meanings. As Merleau-Ponty explains in his 1960s
lectures, “nature is what has a meaning without this
meaning having been posed by thought” [1]. This position does not reduce nature to a cultural construct
because, ultimately, it views nature not as a thing but
as a ground and horizon of experience itself.

T

he difficulty is that many theorists want to establish nature as something independent of and “beyond” the experience of nature. This perspective
inclines toward a conception of nature as a thing in itself
landing us back in a kind of Kantian position of a “natural” realm that we cannot attain. Phenomenology, on
the other hand, has always conceived of the natural
world as not a thing in itself but as a thing of experience.
This thing of experience is not thereby reduced to subjective experience, pure and simple, because all experience is viewed as intersubjectively, historically, and culturally embedded.
Phenomenologically, we also recognize that there
are both the pregiven and the given that characterize any
experience and that allow us to speak of the constitution
of nature in that experience. Finally, we understand that
the constitution of nature is not the same as the creation
or production of nature. As philosopher Ted Toadvine
suggested nearly 20 years ago,
The truth of the claim that nature simply is nature as experienced
is demonstrated precisely by the world, the world we know and see
all around us. This is the world of our experience—none other. Any
world with which we intend to deal must come to us through this
very one [2].

A

nother misunderstanding about phenomenology is in viewing phenomenological distinctions as separations. In any experience, there is
a constitutive act and that which is given—these are two
sides of the same experience and they are distinct but
not separate. One cannot be without the other. Nature
cannot be without subject, subject cannot be without nature. It is true that if we focus upon consciousness as the
sole key to understanding experience then nature becomes secondary. Husserlian genetic phenomenology,
however, begins with the natural concept of the world.
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Husserl describes this as the lifeworld way into phenomenology as opposed to his earlier Cartesian way.
By beginning with the natural concept of the world,
we draw into question the apodicticity of consciousness in favor of the pregivenness of the world. In other
words, it is an acknowledgement that we are always
already aware of the world before we consciously turn
toward it in analysis or reflection.
What we must investigate, then, is that world of
which we are always already aware. What is its structure? How is it pregiven, presupposed? What are the
conditions of constitution that make experience of nature possible? This leads to an understanding of the
constituting subject that is lived-body, in-the-world,
and a thoroughly intersubjective meaning never separated off from the natural world.

T

hat world with which we begin and from which
subjectivity or consciousness can never be separated is what Husserl called the lifeworld. The
lifeworld is the environing world, the surrounding
world of our everyday sense that grounds any conception of an objective scientific world. Does this mean
that lifeworld is subjective? Not for Husserl. It is a
false division to establish an objective world over
against subjectivity. Instead, Husserl speaks of lifeworld as having an essential structure that he calls the
lifeworld a priori.
This deeper conception of the lifeworld includes
the objective sciences as well as the constituted cultural worlds of homeworld and alienworld [3]. The
lifeworld is not just empirical sensuous experience. It
includes ideas and scientific theories and their results
within it because it is the pregiven, unthematized, natural world of experience.
The general structures that Husserl wants to focus
upon are those elements of the lifeworld that are
bound to its relative being as homeworld or alienworld; in other words, those that cannot be separated
off from any particular cultural world, but that are
themselves not relative. These are the lifeworld a priori. This universal lifeworld a priori is distinct from
an objective a priori that has been established by the
idealizing sciences. The sciences are dismissive of
their own foundations within a lifeworld full of presuppositions in favor of their universal, idealized, geometrized world.

Instead, Husserl is interested in the common structure that all cultural worlds share regardless of their layers of sedimented cultural history. This lifeworld a priori is still a perceptual world whereas an objective lifeworld is not.
One of the ways to avoid the mistaken separation
of subject from world is to avoid thinking of the lifeworld as an object. Lifeworld is not something we can
experience in its wholeness. It is not something we can
grasp as an object, not even if we acknowledge that it is
an intersubjective object.
This understanding still relies upon an idea of the
subject as absolute and everything as relative to it—the
subject as master and commander of world. Instead, if
we think of lifeworld in terms of its transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience of any homeworld or alienworld, we come closer to what Husserl, in
his later work, means by the term [4]. Husserl explains:
There exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the
life-world), though together the two make up an inseparable unity.
Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the lifeworld), are ‘given’ as being valid for us in each case (in some mode
or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that
we are conscious of them as things or objects within the worldhorizon [5].

T

he important term here is horizon, which is not
something that can ever be made an object of experience but is nevertheless entailed in any experience, for all experience is horizonal. This means
that the horizon that is lifeworld is pregiven rather than
given, that it is the very condition of any objects of
world as being given. Because lifeworld is pregiven, it
cannot be described in the same way we might describe
a cultural homeworld or alienworld, as having particular
characteristics or a peculiar sense. Rather, it is the very
condition of the possibility of sense, but which itself
cannot be made an object of sense. It is horizon and
ground of both culturally relative homeworlds and alienworlds.
To think of lifeworld not as object but as horizon is
to recognize it as a way in which something is experienced or revealed. That which is presupposed in the
constitution of anything at all is the pregiven lifeworld
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as horizon of such constitution. It is about a style of
constitution of which we are unaware and which remains unthematized because it is the very condition
of constitution of a cultural world and, as horizon of
constitution, cannot be brought to presence itself. That
lifeworld horizon is at the same time a ground of every
experience of homeworld or alienworld, since it entails the world history of earth that belongs to every
people of earth.

S

o what accounts for our sense that nature exists
independently of us and is not our human construction? I would suggest here that nature, insofar as it is given, makes possible the sense that it is
not simply a matter of our constitution. Givenness of
anything of experience is what challenges us or calls
us forth into the experience. A thing draws our attention, asks for our focus upon it, or makes itself felt in
the background of a constitutional activity. We do not
come up with experience out of whole cloth.
The importance of a phenomenology of nature
comes precisely from this particular vantage point that
phenomenology makes possible. It is the vantage
point that allows for the theorist to see herself as always involved in the world and responding to the
world rather than separating herself from the world
and making that world an object.
A phenomenology of nature also allows us to recognize that, in spite of differences of homeworld or
alienworld, there are fundamental structures of lifeworld pregiven in any worldly givenness. Nature is
never object to my subject. Rather, we are intertwined
in such a fundamental way that I can respond to the
call to attentiveness to nature that allows me to recognize my embeddedness within a pregiven nature,
while at the same time acknowledging my unique role
in the renewal and critique of the values that are
passed along through any response to nature.

O

nce we begin thinking of policy-making or implementation, we tend to leave phenomenology
behind and to take on the instrumental, reductive approach as masters of nature that we recognize
theoretically to be problematic. How can phenomenology hold us to account? What renewal and critique requires of us is an understanding of traditional ways of
thinking and responding to nature that establish our role
as masters of nature, as the ones who can put things
right. Critique requires of us that we draw that approach
into question by attempting as far as possible to expose
the pregiven elements of our constitution and attempt to
move forward with a new kind of thinking.
What a genetic phenomenology of nature can offer,
then, is a partner to the more empirical, concrete sciences that are focused on environmental issues, which
are issues of world and nature. In allowing us to peel
away sedimented layers of sense, genetic phenomenology helps to reveal the presuppositions of our everyday
approach to the natural world and, in so doing, leaves
us prepared for a process of renewal and critique.
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P

henomenology has not, for me, been a point
of departure. I have never thought of it as an
approach, method, or way of working that I
might apply. Like most things philosophical,
it has grown on me more or less serendipitously and
has wormed its way into my thinking without my really noticing it.
No doubt, this home-grown phenomenology
takes all kinds of liberties with the canonical texts,
many of which I am happy to leave unread. Textual
exegesis is a task for trained philosophers and not for
amateurs like me. I have always been slightly bemused by scholars who bury their heads in the most
arcane and impenetrable of texts in the effort, they explain, to get to the bottom of our experience as beings
in a world. You would think that the best way to
fathom the depths of human experience would be to
attend to the world itself and to learn directly from
what it has to tell us.
This, of course, is what inhabitants do all the
time, in their daily lives, and they have much to teach
us. That’s why I remain, both by training and at heart,
an anthropologist and not a philosopher. If we are to
begin to resolve the crisis in our relations with what
we call the “natural world,” then we should be listening to the wisdom of its inhabitants, both human and
non-human, rather than taking shelter in the closeted
self-referentiality of philosophical discourse.

N

evertheless, in much the same way as phenomenology, anthropology struggles with
what looks like a mismatch between ethical
principle and scholarly practice. For while claiming to
study with and to learn from our interlocutors, we anthropologists have a nasty habit of turning lessons

learned into material for analysis. This is what happens
when we say that what we are actually doing is ethnography. It is like turning the telescope to look through the
wrong end. Instead of calling on the experience we have
shared with those among whom we have worked to enlarge our vision of the world, we take our sights from
the Olympian heights of theory to scrutinize the thinking of our erstwhile teachers.
The source of the problem, I believe, lies with that
little word of. I have long held doubts about the fundamental postulate of phenomenology, namely that consciousness must always be consciousness of, precisely
because it puts the telescope the wrong way round.
Likewise, when we invoke the phenomenology or the
anthropology of this or that, it seems that we run rings
around the thing in question, turning the places or the
paths from which we observe into circumscribed topics
of inquiry.
The operative word, I think, should not be of but
with. I would start from the postulate, then, that consciousness is always consciousness with, before it is
ever consciousness of. Whereas ‘of-ness’ is intentional,
‘with-ness’, I would argue, is attentional. And what it
sets up are relations not of intersubjectivity but correspondence.

T

he problem in our relations with the natural
world, then, is that we have forgotten how to correspond with the beings and things of which it is
comprised. We have been so concerned with the interaction between ourselves and others that we have failed
to notice how both we and they go along together in the
current of time. This, surely, is what sustainability
means: not the perpetuation of a completed form or stable state but the capacity to keep going, to carry on, or
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to perdure. If interaction is about othering, then correspondence is about togethering. It is about the ways
along which lives, in their perpetual unfolding or becoming, answer to one another.
This shift from interaction to correspondence entails a fundamental reorientation, from the betweenness of beings and things to their in-between-ness.
Think of a river and its banks. We might speak of the
relation of one bank to the other, and crossing a
bridge, we might find ourselves halfway between the
two. But the banks are continually being formed and

reformed by the waters of the river as they sweep by.
These waters flow in between the banks, along a line
orthogonal to the span of the bridge.
To say of beings and things that they are in-between is to align our awareness with the waters; to correspond with them is to join this awareness with the
flow. Just such a shift of orientation is needed, I believe,
if we are to understand the world of nature as one that
we do not only experience but can also live with or inhabit both now and for the foreseeable future.
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When something has acquired a form, it metamorphoses immediately to a new one. If we wish to arrive at some
living perception of nature, we ourselves must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example
she gives.
—J. W. von Goethe (quoted in Miller 1988, p. 64)

W

hether we observe a natural phenomenon on a relative micro-scale (e.g., a
sprouting spring flower) or on a macroscale (e.g., an oak forest through the
seasons), it is evident that transformation underlies all
things. While many transformations are gradual and
imperceptible—consider the growth of a pine tree—
many others are abrupt and even startling, such as a
butterfly emerging from its chrysalis. Underlying these
disparate examples is the recognition that change takes
place in a temporal dimension—i.e., change occurs
over various time spans.
We can, however, extend our observations to an
apparently stationary object, say a wildflower on the
edge of a trail, and ask whether there is evidence of
change across a spatial dimension. In other words, does
the organism, in the moment, offer us a picture of
transformation among its various parts and structures?
Furthermore, if we gaze, for example, into a tide
pool, and we note the differently shaped shells of the
various snail species, we can ask: What is it that
changes from one form to another? What form elements shift (e.g., height of spire, number of whorls,
number and distinctiveness of ribs) and to what degree
do they change?
As I hope to show, these are not idle questions but
necessary first steps of a phenomenological method
that can lead us to a cognitive experience of wholeness
expressed within and among living organisms.

The pioneer of the particular phenomenological
path I outline here is the influential poet, playwright,
and naturalist J. W. von Goethe (1749–1832), who developed a way of science centered on keen, penetrating
observation (Amrine et al. 1987; Seamon and Zajonc
1998; Bortoft 1996, 2012; Holdrege 2013; Riegner
2013).
Here, I do not explicate the epistemological underpinnings of the breadth and depth of Goethe’s contribution. Rather, I focus on a central aspect of Goethean
phenomenology: the notion of metamorphosis. As expressed in the opening epigraph, Goethe saw all phenomena as transitory—momentary manifestations
moving from a past toward a future.
Be they clouds, rivers, plants, animals, or the observer, all phenomena are embedded in an ongoing
process of metamorphosis. Furthermore, by carefully
attending to the metamorphosis of the phenomenon at
hand, the observer can be led into a cognitive experience of the wholeness of the phenomenon.
In this essay, I attempt to lead the reader toward
this cognitive experience or, at the very least, to offer
an explanation of what this experience may entail.

B

efore we look at natural phenomena, it may be
instructive to begin with a geometric example
(fig. 1, next page). As we glance at the shapes
from left to right (or from right to left), note that shape
and size change in an orderly manner. Furthermore, the
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One final point regarding this pictorial sequence:
A distinguishing feature expressed through the relationship of the shapes to each other is that they exhibit
both difference and sameness simultaneously. In other
words, each shape in the sequence can be considered
the same shape expressed in various degrees of modification. I will return to this point later, but for now we
can ask: How does this example apply to the notion of
metamorphosis in nature?

I

n The Metamorphosis of Plants, Goethe (1790)
took great pains to describe clearly and objectively
the various organs of the plant, noting morphological details of shape, size, juxtaposition, and so forth.
One of his many key insights was the observation that
the plant is all “leaf,” meaning there is one transformative movement, one gesture (not an actual leaf) that
comes to expression through the various spatially arranged organs, such as among the leaves up the stem,
in the calyx, corolla, and stamens:

shading changes in a stepwise fashion. Several features
appear to be correlated and accordingly change in concert.
If the shapes were cut out and reordered randomly,
a student would have little problem arranging them in
the original orderly progression. One would also be
able easily to draw an intermediate oval shape that
could logically “fit” between any two shapes in the series, say between d and e. This is possible because we
readily grasp the context that gives meaning to the order of the shapes—and is itself accessed through the
shapes. That context then informs our ability to draw a
“missing” shape. Moreover, rather than seeing the
shapes as isolated phenomena juxtaposed in space, we
instinctively see them as steps in a developmental process, frozen moments in a continuum.
How many missing shapes are there? Clearly, as a
property of a continuum, there exists an infinite number of missing or, better, potential shapes in the sequence. In fact, between any two shapes, there exists
an infinite number of potential shapes. There are, however, limits to the infinite number of potential shapes
because not any random shape will do. Like hearing a
wrong note played in a melody, we would immediately
notice an incorrect shape misplaced in the sequence.

The organ that expanded on the stem as leaf, assuming a variety
of forms, is the same organ that now contracts in the calyx, expands again in the petal, contracts in the reproductive apparatus,
only to expand finally as fruit (ibid., p. 100).

In other words, there is one ideal organ that comes
to expression in modified form along the length of the
plant. This is the essence of metamorphosis: Both unity
and its manifestation in diversity are entwined in the
phenomenon. Evidence of this notion includes plant
structures that are morphological combinations of two
organs, as if the differentiation process were unable to
actualize fully; or organs that appear in the “wrong”
place. This can occur as a “mistake” in development,
such as the proliferous rose that caught Goethe’s attention in that it possessed a stem with leaves protruding
from the center of the flower; or the proliferous carnation that exhibited multiple additional stalked flowers
growing out of the main corolla (ibid., pp. 93–96).
Many plant species, however, demonstrate configurations of incomplete differentiation under normal
circumstances, e.g., the familiar poinsettia (Euphorbia
pulcherrima; Euphorbiaceae), in which the pollinatorattraction role, usually characteristic of the corolla, is
shifted to the brilliant red upper leaves; or the neotropical heliconias (Heliconiaceae) where intermediate
forms between leaf and bract are typical (fig. 2, left).
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T

o grasp fully the notion of metamorphosis, one
needs to hold difference and sameness simultaneously in one’s consciousness (as in the example of figure 1). Bortoft (2012) described this cognitive
experience as an act of distinguishing:

leaf size expands then contracts, or how leaf shape becomes less differentiated and then more complex, or
how the relative length of the petiole (leaf stalk) at one
point begins to shorten. Regarding the contraction of
leaf size toward the apex of the stem, one observes that
the final leaves seem to disappear from space; they become insubstantial so that a new metamorphic impulse
can come into being, that of the flower.

Distinguishing is a dual movement of thinking which goes in opposite directions at once: in one direction it differences [read as a
verb], whereas in the other direction it relates. So the act of distinction ‘differences/relates’—not differences and relates, because this would be two movements, whereas there is one movement which is dual (ibid., p. 22).

B

ased on the preceding, one needs to regard the
space between the leaves—what I will call “betweenness”—as a crucial aspect of the wholeness of the phenomenon. Just as in the structure of a
musical melody the intervals are equally as important
as the notes, experiencing betweenness among the
parts of an organism—a plant, in this case—is the key
to finding wholeness, or meaning, in the phenomenon.
Brady (1998) referred to this quality of betweenness as
the “context of movement,” which relates and integrates all the spatially disparate parts into a unified
whole.
Of course, nothing tangible is in motion in figure
3; it’s only in the mind’s eye that a movement or gesture comes to expression. But once the attentive observer grasps the context of movement—the dynamic
quality of betweenness in the metamorphosis—it becomes objectively evident what may constitute the potential, as yet unmanifested, forms. Just as one can
draw endless triangles or rectangles if one grasps the
“rules” that inform them, so can one draw
endless leaves that could conceivably fit
into the sequence.
The next step is to regard how a particular flower is associated with a given
leaf metamorphosis. Compared to imagining a potential leaf in the sequence, this effort is much more challenging because it
entails a yet deeper cognitive experience
of the plant, an experience that approaches
what Goethe described as the Urpflanze or
“Archetypal Plant.” Goethe pointed to this
experience and its associated application:

We can practice this mode of cognition by studying the leaf metamorphosis of a given plant. As in
many annual plants, the ragleaf bahia (Bahia dissecta;
Asteraceae) (fig. 3, below), a common plant of the central Arizona highlands, exhibits a marked transformation of the leaf shape up the stem, technically
known as heterophylly. In preparing this figure, I removed the leaves from the stem and then dried,
pressed, and arranged them in a spiral, the lowest stem
leaves at the bottom left; the uppermost leaves and terminal flowers, near the center of the arrangement.
One can readily see the progression of one leaf
shape to the next in the sequence. Clearly, no two
leaves are identical. Note that it’s through their ordered
differences that the movement or gesture becomes intelligible. As in figure 1, there are several morphological trajectories that intersect. For instance, note how

With this model and the key to it, it will be possible
to go on forever inventing plants and know that
their existence is logical; that is to say, if they do
not actually exist, they could, for they are not the
shadow phantoms of vain imagination, but possess
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an inner necessity and truth (from Goethe’s Italian Journey, in
Brady 1987, p. 268).

extending from the upper trunk (fig. 4a, below). Its
bark is white and even rubs off like talcum powder.
The individual leaves flutter with the slightest breeze
(hence the Latin species name) and, in the autumn, turn
a stunning gold before dropping. One can regard the
aspen as having an open “sensitivity” to its surroundings: the trembling leaves, the thin bark, the dramatic
seasonal change of appearance, and the delicate, fuzzy
catkins. More than many temperate tree species, the architecture of the aspen resembles a neuron complete
with axon and dendrites (fig. 4b).
In striking contrast, the alligator juniper (Juniperus deppeana; Cupressaceae), found mostly at lower
elevations than the aspen but overlapping in some areas, exhibits a rounded, enclosing crown, in which
dense clumps of needles sway together when a strong
breeze moves through the tree (fig. 4c). The bark, from
which the tree gets its common name, is remarkably
thick and deeply furrowed (fig. 4d). As a conifer, the
juniper is evergreen and shows little change in appear-

If we direct our attention toward seeing the botanical structures clearly in all their detail, and seeing betweenness not as an intellectual abstraction or as an
empty void but as a dynamic reality, then we approach
what can be considered the organizing principle and
the dynamic wholeness of the plant. Bortoft (1996, pp.
240–241) describes this experience; note how the distinction between subject and object, observer and observed, simultaneously unites/dissolves:
The organizing principle of the phenomenon itself, which is its
intrinsic necessity, comes into expression in the activity of thinking when this consists in trying to think the phenomenon concretely. What is experienced is not a representation of the organizing principle, a copy of it ‘in the mind,’ but the organizing principle itself acting in thinking.

I

n the last part of this essay, I outline some possible
examples of this phenomenological approach
through which we can attempt to grasp betweenness as a dynamic reality such that all parts become revelations of the whole. Besides observing
and comparing the structures of a plant, one can
apply the same way of seeing to an animal.
Holdrege (1999), for example, examines the biological details of the sloth, noting how all its parts,
including behavior, integrate into an expressive
whole. No part of the animal is superfluous and
each has significance in the context of the living
organism.
Another approach is to contrast two seemingly very different organisms so that each can be
used to illuminate the other. Here, too, Holdrege
(1998) provides an example in his comparison of
the horse and the lion; whereas the horse accentuates, for instance, the skeletal system and hooves
by providing a rigid support structure (the horse
can sleep standing up), the lion is dominated by
the muscular system, which exhibits remarkable
suppleness and dramatic swings between tension
and relaxation (when relaxed, the lion collapses to
the ground).
One can apply this comparative method also
on a landscape level. For example, in the central
Arizona highlands, the aspen (Populus tremuloides; Salicaceae) is a familiar and striking tree.
It has a thin, tall, straight appearance, its branches
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ance through the seasons, thus a relative lack of sensitivity to its surroundings. Like the tree itself, its fruits
are spherical, fleshy berries relished by wildlife.
In comparing the aspen and alligator juniper, one
notes they are morphological polarities; once these
endpoints are identified, one has a context to examine
other local trees with “intermediate” forms. For example, the ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa; Pinaceae),
another conifer, with its less dense, more airy structure
and flaky, even sweet-smelling, bark, exhibits a more
open architecture than the “self-enclosed” alligator juniper, while the emory oak (Quercus emoryi; Fagaceae), with its partly stunted, twisted architecture,
thick, grooved bark, and stiff, contracted leaves, also
stands between the juniper and aspen but leans somewhat closer to the former. Just as the leaf sequence of
an annual plant creates a context for envisioning potential leaves, so a careful comparison of forest trees
offers a descriptive means to situate particular species
in a web of morphological relationships (Schad 1967).

T

he search for betweenness via the Goethean tradition can be extended further to examine an entire group of closely related (or not necessarily
related) organisms. One ground-breaking work is biologist Wolfgang Schad’s study of the entire class of
mammals (Schad 1977, 2012; Riegner 1998). Echoing
Goethe’s archetypal plant, Schad’s exhaustive observations uncover the interweaving of morphological trajectories that reiterate in various configurations in different species of mammals. Inspired by Schad’s contribution, researchers have used his approach to investigate morphological patterns in dinosaurs (Lockley
2008), birds (Riegner 2008), and general patterns of
evolution (Rosslenbroich 2014).
These journeys into whole-organism biology are
just a beginning. In time, as more studies demonstrate
the value of a phenomenological approach, a metamorphosis of the sciences themselves may lead to new explorations of the dynamics of wholeness in nature.

Figures: 1. Sequence of oval shapes; 2. Heliconia plant showing
transition (“metamorphosis”) between leaf and bract; 3. Leaves
and flowers of ragleaf bahia; note the metamorphosis; 4a. Aspen
tree in autumn colors; 4b. aspen architecture’s resemblance to a
neuron, with axon and dendrites; 4c. alligator juniper; 4d. detail
of alligator juniper bark.
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G

iven the centrality of the concept of nature
within phenomenological inquiry, it
should be no surprise that many philosophers have turned to that philosophical tradition to address environmental issues. In addition to
the conceptual insights phenomenology has offered,
the method’s emphasis on experience has contributed
to creating space for a diversity of voices that might
not otherwise be heard within the philosophical community.
To my mind, however, the most important contribution phenomenology has made to environmentalism is the reminder that the philosophical questions
relating to nature are not merely conceptual puzzles
but emerge from both our personal and collective connection to and affection for the world in which we
live.
Even as phenomenologists have written about,
among other themes, the human relationship to the environment and animal life, the narratives that shape
that relationship, and the constitution and value of
places, valid and important criticisms have emerged
regarding various elements of phenomenological
method. These have included a perceived anthropocentrism, a less than adequate conception of materiality, and a persistent, unacknowledged subjectivism.
While in some cases the charges are somewhat
overblown, what these criticisms reveal is the need for
phenomenology to evolve and adapt as a method so as
to meet current challenges, particularly those posed
by the environment. Specifically, challenges deriving
from new materialisms (e.g., Karen Barad, Isabelle
Stengers, and Bruno Latour) need to be addressed for
phenomenology to retain its relevance.

The particular force behind these views stems from
the conception of the world they advocate and how that
conception both jibes with phenomenological goals and
requires the reformation of certain phenomenological
principles. Take, for example, the case of Latour. While
he explicitly rejects the category of nature, distancing
himself from the traditional phenomenologists such as
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, throughout his work one
finds the same motivation that inspires all phenomenologists: a return to experience as the foundation of philosophical inquiry.
What is interesting is how the two approaches diverge depending on whether one begins, as in most varieties of phenomenology, with lived experience or, as
with Latour and many of the new materialisms, with an
asubjective conception of experience. The former, as
Heidegger had already noted nearly a century ago, is yet
another manifestation of modernity’s dualistic subjectobject metaphysics. If the Heideggerian and Latourian
rejection of lived experience is an apt one, phenomenologists might learn from these new materialisms a new
starting point that complicates our inquiries and enriches our findings.

I

n terms of these complications, there are several
methodological issues with which phenomenologically-minded environmental philosophers must
reckon:
 Acknowledging that human experience is one kind of experience among many and thereby recognizing that human experience cannot be a foundation for generalizable claims about
the environment;
 Understanding subjectivity as a complex network of relations
formed both through complex biological networks as well as
through complex interpersonal and institutional networks;
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 Coming to terms with the less adversarial understanding of
technology and the sciences that accompanies the attribution
of agency and experience to things in the world.

This list is intended neither to be exhaustive nor
to imply that there are not contemporary phenomenologists already attentive to these issues. Rather, it is
meant to give a sense of how phenomenology might
adapt and expand to include insights not only from
contemporary philosophers but now more established
lines of critique as found in the work of, for example,
Foucault and Deleuze.
The ways in which these adaptations might enrich the phenomenological project are also myriad.
For one, consider the various phenomenologies possible once nonhumans are acknowledged to have a form
of subjectivity proper to them! Rather than endless debates about whether animals “have” consciousness or
reason, the discussion shifts to how diverse forms of
life display a rationality proper to them by constructing a world of relations for themselves through whatever means are available to them cognitively and environmentally. Though the potential for making phenomenological errors increases, by engaging with
other forms of animal life in this way we may be able
to envision better ways to construct a human world
more inclusive of our fellow non-human beings.
Including specific technological and institutional
analyses as a part of our thinking about the human relationship to nature can shed light on the psychological and social obstacles to adopting a more environmentally friendly lifestyle:
 How does a certain technique affect our view of other beings?
 How could reorganizing a specific social arrangement lead
to a more sustainable way of interacting with each other and
with the earth?
 How might we reconsider the notion of community to include both animate and inanimate aspects of the environment?

Again, these questions have not necessarily been
ignored, but the decentering of the human in phenomenological research may yield new findings.

A

s one example, consider some of the ways in
which many phenomenologists consider the
concept of nature: following Husserl, as an

idealized and mathematized object, derived from the
personalistic attitude, correlative to an intentional consciousness or, following philosophers like Hans Jonas
and David Abram, as itself an organism and a subject.
While the latter serves to counteract the kinds of
excesses environmentalists have identified with the
modernistic conception of nature (and Husserl himself
was critical of those tendencies as well in The Crisis of
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology), the understanding of nature as a subject or an
organism still utilizes the same fundamental metaphysical categories to understand the world as the modernistic conception of nature, that of subjects and objects.
If the new materialisms mentioned above have any
consistent view between them shared with phenomenologists, it is that the subject-object metaphysics must be
abandoned. Perhaps what we learn from their criticisms
is that phenomenology has not been as thorough as it
could be in expunging these ghosts of modernity. Rather than considering nature as a being that possesses
inherent properties in need of preservation, we might
move toward a more relational conception of nature. Essentially, this shift amounts to a choice between two
contrasting conceptions of networks:
 On one hand, a perspective associated with the organismic
conception of nature in which there is an inherent order to an
ecological system that must be maintained;
 On the other hand, a perspective associated with the relational
conception in which the order present in ecological systems is
largely contingent. In this latter view, organisms do not possess ecological niches but they create them, and environments
are largely a result of the creative activity of organisms and the
geological forces of the earth.

W

hile I have been emphasizing the need for
phenomenology to change, there are also
myriad ways in which the insights of the phenomenological tradition can be helpful to philosophers
endorsing new materialisms. For example, Martin
Drenthen and John van Buren have both pointed out
ways in which hermeneutic methods might be employed to address environmental problem-solving, both
in terms of eliminating disagreement and opening up
possibilities for interpreting exactly what the problems
are that we face.
Another possible contribution derives from the history of phenomenological engagement with science and
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technology. Given the similarities between phenomenologists’ and new materialists’ criticisms of the modern scientific worldview, new materialisms would be
remiss to dismiss phenomenological critique as mere
doom and gloom or overly romantic and pessimistic.
In many cases, phenomenological concerns can serve
as a useful guardrail against slipping back into the
technological excesses of modernity.
Last, phenomenologists’ emphasis on the ineliminable affective dimension to experience can continue
to have an important role in decision-making regarding the design of places, especially if the material
world is more affectively sensitive than previously
given credit for.

S

o, if this alliance of phenomenology and new
forms of materialism is possible, the question
remains of what kinds of changes in practice
and inquiry become possible on that basis. To explore
this question, consider the interplay between concerns
about embodiment and the question of novel ecosystems. While there may contemporarily be good prudential and political reasons to maintain reservations
about the creation of such systems, on a relational
conception of nature there is no way to reject their establishment out-of-hand and without discussion. After
all, if there is no one way that nature is meant to be,
no one order that must be preserved, what obstacles
are there to establishing new biotic communities? In
this way, humans may take a more active hand in
shaping ecological communities in a manner similar
to what Steven Vogel has called the “social construction of the environment.”
We do not, however, need to restrict ourselves to
what is best for human beings in making these
choices. Rather, we might aim for, as Karen Barad
puts it, “making a better world, a livable world, a
world based on values of co-flourishing and mutuality, not fighting and diminishing one another, not
closing one another down, but helping to open up our
ideas and ourselves to each other and to new possibilities, which with any luck will have the potential to
help us see our way through to a world that is more

livable, not for some, but for the entangled wellbeing of
all” [1].
Setting some of these ideals as our goals, it is necessary to think through the effects on others’ embodiment, including the nonhuman and perhaps even the
nonliving, in order to realize them. In this way, our enriched phenomenological insights might give new
meaning to Aldo Leopold’s injunction to “think like a
mountain.”
Theoretical constructs, like species, need to evolve
to survive. At this point in history, phenomenology
faces both philosophical and institutional pressures to
do so. To meet these pressures, I will humbly make one
final recommendation pertaining to our style of writing.
Currently, so-called “continental” approaches to the environment tend to base themselves in dense exposition
of texts. While these can be useful to fellow scholars
and have value in terms of clarifying the views of historical philosophers, the approach allows others who are
unfamiliar with (or perhaps averse to) the ideas of the
philosophers under consideration to ignore our work. If
we were more open to addressing the currently prevalent ideas in environmental philosophy more generally
in language that is not specific to particular philosophers, this would make our work more difficult to ghettoize and to ignore. Philosophers like Ingrid Stefanovic
and Irene Klaver might serve as models in this regard.

G

iven the positive contributions the phenomenological method has made and could make to environmental philosophy, I hope we rise to these
challenges. What the phenomenological philosophy
that emerges from these trials has in common with a
philosophy like Stengers’ “ecology of practices” remains to be determined. But we should be encouraged
both by the continuity of concerns between them as well
as the potential such affiliations have for removing us
from some of the major theoretical impasses of the
twentieth century.

Note
1. Karen Barad, “Erasers and Erasures: Pinch’s Unfortunate ‘Uncertainty Principle’,” Social Studies of Science 41: 450.
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A

leaves that they seemed to be merging into the air. This motion
brought me closer to a sense of what the gesture of the grasstree
might be [1].

fter years of full-time environmental advocacy followed by an academic career
teaching place phenomenology and supervising students in phenomenological and
other qualitative research methods, I immersed myself
in retirement in place making on Bruny Island, Tasmania.
Through publishing nine of my essays in EAP,
David Seamon has generously provided me with the
opportunity to explore questions relating to place, phenomenology, and environmental concerns. In the spirit
of giving voice to place that has infused my ‘Letters
from Far South,” I leaven my commentary with brief
accounts of some of the encounters my partner Vicki
and I have had with the more-than-human world of
“Blackstone,” our 55 acres of land on the island.

Undertaking Goethean science offered a stance of
openness toward the natural world, an attitude of receptivity through intuitive sensing. It also raised many
questions of practice. It took many hours over a long
period of sitting, drawing, intuiting, and writing to
gain even a simplified understanding of particular
plants and rocks from a Goethean perspective. In addition, there are limitations to the broader applicability
of this approach. It requires a commitment that many
people, even sympathetic observers, would lack the
time and inclination to make. In the latter stages of the
process I used, the understandings were fleeting and
numinous—not easily transferable to everyday perception despite their emotional power at the time.
Their main effect has been to open me to a depth of
communication and communion with elements of the
natural world that I had previously not experienced.

T

he experience of place making became more intertwined with phenomenological perspectives
and practices as our time on Bruny progressed.
As various phenomena—for example, the form of a
sandstone rock shelf or the charred trunk of a
grasstree—seized my attention, I drew on Goethean
science, a proto-phenomenological practice, to explore
them more deeply:

B

y virtue of our choice to produce our own electricity, rely on rainwater, have composting toilets, and grow some of our own produce, I
could write more directly about what it was like to live
more sustainably. Here the power of phenomenology
in constantly focusing on the experience itself, rather
than theories or ideas about sustainability, showed itself. On some occasions, producing our own power
was energizing and affirming:

I was drawn to sit much closer, into the enclosure of the fallen
leaves, and the universe did indeed become suddenly compact.
There was an odd juxtaposition between the intimacy of the space
created by the “hair” hanging down to the ground, the breath of
the breeze, and the harshness of the snake-like “skin” seared
black. From within the fibrous cave beneath the grasstree, I could
imagine the movement of the plant drawing nutrients from the
earth upward, meeting fire and producing such delicate elongated

One spring afternoon I was striding down toward the house with
a bracing wind blowing straight off the Channel into my face and
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the sun glinting off the water into my eyes. I exulted in the
strength of the elements and lengthened my stride. “It’s a high
energy day today,” I declared to Vicki, and we enjoyed the new
layer of meaning that term now had for us [2].

We planted 4,000 native trees, shrubs, and plugs
of native grasses. We sprayed thistles. In some seasons, the place did look a “bloody mess,” and I felt like
one, too, veering erratically between despondency and
elation as the trees grew, but weeds and pests proliferated.
There is value in a phenomenological account of
such processes, if only to provide a salutary tale for
those who undertake land regeneration, as we did, with
more idealism than expertise, and to those who glibly
advocate tree planting as a panacea. In the end, though,
I was able to write:

On other occasions, it proved to be more psychologically challenging than I had imagined:
Behind my wry self-description of being “technically challenged”
lay a psychologically slippery slope. I quickly had to overcome
my fear of approaching any unfamiliar machine without an expert
by my side, as all the “experts” were in Hobart and reluctant to
make the ferry journey to Bruny. Technical instructions from
Simply Solar by phone about our declining batteries often left me
puzzled and, at worst, in confused desperation. I re-experienced
boyhood anxieties about my lack of practical aptitude and common sense [3].

I do have the strong sense that as the birds in the fields check out
our planted trees, the ladybirds and skinks take refuge in the tree
guards, and some self-sown eucalypts begin to appear now the
sheep have left, we are working in partnership with the regenerative forces of the land [5].

Another aspect of our environmental ethos was
our desire to re-vegetate our degraded sheep paddocks
and provide sanctuary for endangered and other wildlife. Our experience was a far cry from the gradual
deepening of relationship implied by advocates of ecological restoration with phrases such as “restoring the
land, healing the mind” [4]. The neighboring grazier
predicted angrily that our land would be a bloody mess
if we removed his sheep.

Spending each morning up in the paddocks gave
me the opportunity for encountering more of the wildlife. Our lived environmental ethic has evolved during
our time on Bruny. An attitude of care and respect for
wildlife grew into recognition of the agency and creative presence of other species. At university, I had
taught students about moral considerability and the
rights of other species, but confronting the power and
fierce gaze of a flesh-and-blood-and-feathers equal
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“What deeper experience am I being offered by the
natural world in this moment? How do I respond?” [9].
Perhaps this is an inevitable aspect of the phenomenological endeavor—a prolonged inquiry into any phenomenon changes both the experience and one’s capacity to experience.
The process of chronicling what has occurred at
Blackstone became an integral part of life, but it
quickly became insufficient simply to narrate events.
As researchers such as van Manen have emphasized,
an essential part of producing a phenomenological account is rewriting, seeking always to cleave to the experience itself [10]. “Is that actually what happened?”
and “What was it really like, as opposed to what I think
it should be like” became constant questions and frequently exposed how I embellished my accounts. I’d
argue that my best writing involved a lived reciprocity
between experiencing and describing: the more I
honed my writing, the closer attention I paid to my experience, the richer my life became, thus providing
more useful material for reflection and further writing.

was a different matter altogether. One of the turning
points was direct engagement with the eagles:
The eagle has hovered above my head on several occasions since,
and each time I have met her fierce gaze as directly as I can. My
pulse still races and the skin on the back of my neck still tingles
as I hold all possibilities for the encounter open. It’s another shift
in attention, I realize. I’m so accustomed to being the one who is
checking things out that it’s odd to let myself be the object of a
large wild creature’s curiosity when she is clearly unafraid of me.
The eagle is calling the shots, not me; she decides how long she
will remain poised over my head [6].

I

t was a similar story with an embodied sense of
place. One of my favored topics when teaching
place phenomenology was Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body-subject [7]. It predisposed me toward explorations in body sensing through Goethean science
and more generally in everyday life.
The notion of the inseparability of person and
world rolls easily off the tongue and pen, but when I
felt it physically, I was disconcerted. For example, one
day while floating on my back in Blackstone Bay, I
distinctly sensed an unspoken “conversation” between
my body and the enclosing water [8]. In retrospect, I
realize I was unsettled because I felt that the water was
not only alive but was in some sort of mysterious communication directly through my skin beyond my conscious understanding or control. Body and brine were
somehow interpenetrating, so that one of the primary
boundaries of what I consider myself to be was dissolving. In less dramatic ways, I’ve often felt discomfited on Blackstone when the very experience of
deeper connection with other species or elements of
place that I’ve been reading about and wanting to happen actually occurs.
I came to realize that lived experience isn’t just
the sum of what happens to a person. Under the influence of the phenomenological gaze, as it were, human
experiencing itself becomes a more active process.
The question of attention engaged my mind. The quality of attention as well as the objects of attention—
thistles, marker points, back and shoulder muscles,
and thought processes—became important while
spraying, for example.
In what is almost a paradox, I’ve become more
actively receptive and receptively active in my approach. Susan Murphy’s dictum “accept all offers” as
applied to invitations to pay attention by the morethan-human-world has become a guiding principle:

I

have often struggled to communicate what I have
learned on Blackstone in a way that is helpful for
environmental action, even when there was a
shared ethos:
I drove away from the meeting on local climate change with
mixed feelings. It had been a stimulating event, but I was troubled
by absence of any mention of non-human life. It was of course
implicit in the motivation for action on climate change. I knew
that many of our colleagues shared our concern over the already
visible effect of warming on the Bruny environments and its nonhuman inhabitants. Part of what I had been learning on Blackstone, though, was that human actions are best undertaken in partnership with natural forces, and a place will make it clear what
needs to be done if one is quietly attentive to it. It is inextricably
part of daily life, extending well beyond questions of general motivation. “It’s not just all about people,” I muttered to myself [11].

There is no shortage of advocates for bringing a
place-oriented perspective to bear on local responses
to environmental challenges such as climate change.
Geographer Edward Relph calls for a “pragmatic sense
of place,” bringing the voices of local knowledge and
experience into dialogue while avoiding the pathologies of place, considering alternatives and consequences, and reaching “imperfect but workable agreements” for courses of action [12].
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One evening last month, as the setting sun turned the rock pools
into burnished mirrors and filled the sandstone caves with honeyed light, I was stopped in my tracks by the stillness. Feeling
weak-kneed, I put down the oysters I had collected and sank onto
a nearby mushroom-shaped rock. Spontaneously, I broke into a
Buddhist chant. As my voice reverberated in the sandstone hollows and traversed the still waters, I felt I was singing out a heartfelt thank you to the rocks, waters, and mountains of the Channel,
in gratitude for their simply being there [17].

The difficulty is partly one of language. For example, discussions about climate change, energy, and
land use are usually couched in terms of political feasibility and economic costs and benefits. In contrast,
the language of place affiliation is poetic and evocative, more rooted in the soundscape of the place itself.
When I’ve attempted to bring in the perspectives and
value of other species, I’ve failed to stimulate anything
approaching dialogue.
More fundamentally, environmental philosopher
Val Plumwood contends that we won’t deal effectively
with environmental crises until we have a place-sensitive society in which the dominant institutions of labor
and property take place relations seriously rather than
reducing land to a real estate commodity. Further, she
argues that we must develop the capacity to enter into
dialogical relationships with “earth others” [13].
I am sympathetic to this view and offer tools for
such an undertaking provided by phenomenology and
Goethean science [14]. If, however, human-human
communication over climate change is so difficult, the
prospect of including other species in dialogue, however that is conceived, seems remote indeed.

Notes
1. J. Cameron, Letter from Far South 5, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, 21, 3 (2010): 17.
2.J. Cameron, Letter from Far South 4. Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, 21, 1 (2010): 16.
3. Ibid.
4. This phrase is the subtitle of T. Roszak, M. Gomes, & A. Kanner, eds., Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the
Mind (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1995).
5. Letter from Far South 6. Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, 22, 2 (2011): 17.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London:
Routledge, 1962).
8. Letter from Far South 9. Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, 25, 2 (2014): 22–23.
9. S. Murphy, Upside-Down Zen (Melbourne: Lothian Books,
2004).
10. M. van Manen, Researching Lived Experience (Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 1990); M. van Manen, Phenomenology of Practice (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2014).
11. Excerpted from Letter from Far South 11, Environmental and
Architectural Phenomenology, forthcoming, 2015.
12. E. Relph, T., 2008, A Pragmatic Sense of Place, in Making
Sense of Place, F. Vanclay, M. Higgins, & A. Blackshaw, eds.
(Canberra: National Museum of Australia Press, 2008); reprinted in Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology,
20, 3 (2009): 24–31.
13. V. Plumwood, Environmental Culture (Lndon: Routledge,
2012). Far from any naïve “talk with the animals” suggestion,
Plumwood’s notion of interspecies dialogue is highly sophisticated, based in the combination of decades of ecophilosophical inquiry and a lifetime’s experience of living on her own
in a biodiverse environment.
14. In addition to the phased process of Goethean science I have
employed, there are possibilities such as Shotter’s suggestion
of “withness action” (J. Shotter, Goethe and the Refiguring of
Intellectual Inquiry, Janus Head 8, 1 [2005]: 132–58).
15. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the root word is
the Latin “sanctus,” meaning holy.
16. S. Weil, Attention and Will, in Gravity and Grace (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952).
17. Letter from Far South 8, Environmental and Architectural
Phenomenology, 23, 2 (2012): 21.

N

otwithstanding these many difficulties, I believe that movement toward a more place-responsive culture is a worthy undertaking for a
variety of reasons. Place-based education is richer and
more locally relevant for students. A greater emphasis
on local place relationships reinvigorates local communities and leads to a wide range of social, political,
and environmental actions in defense of place. Placebased education counteracts alienation and disconnection from the rest of life with which humans share the
planet. It provides the basis for a more meaningful,
productive, expressive, and grounded life.
Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a role in caring for the natural world? My ideas about spirituality,
place, and the sacred are changing as a result of our
time on Blackstone. Our attempt to provide sanctuary
for wildlife means more than providing physical refuge as the original meaning of the word as a holy place
infers [15]. All beings, animate and inanimate, are
worthy of reverence. Simone Weil’s contention that
heartfelt attention is a form of prayer resonates
strongly with me [16]. The choice to adopt an attentive
attitude toward all forms of the sentient world in which
we are immersed is ultimately a spiritual one:

Photograph, p. 37: Mist over Blackstone Bay. © 2014 Vicki King
and used with permission.
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E

ncouraging use of public
transit is one important
way to reduce energy consumption and counter climate change. In my research on the
design of Swedish travel centers, I
have studied the transit stations for
the planned “West Link,” an underground railway tunnel through
Gothenburg that will increase the
capacity for commuter traffic.
My method is phenomenological; one result is an
interactive questionnaire that works as a dialog tool
for identifying “soft” spatial qualities that might have
value for collaborative planning processes. I ask how
one might design public-transport spaces that incorporate safety, comfort, unambiguous orientation, and
aesthetic values. A thorough answer to this question
might help designers and planners to create more sustainable, user-friendly urban spaces.

T

he French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (2002)
argued that human beings did not receive sensory impressions passively. Perception, he
claimed, is active. Via a direct, pre-reflective awareness, we stretch ourselves into the world. Drawing on
his work, I have developed a research method that I
call “spatial-sensory analysis” [1].
The human sensory-motor system plays a decisive role in perceiving and understanding space (Hopsch 2008; Johnson 2007; Merleau-Ponty 2002). One
can speak of spatial affordances or a spatiality of situation—i.e., the ways a certain space gives possibilities for human action and interaction.

How we perceive is a theme for psychology and cognitive science. Phenomenology offers a theoretical base for generating architectural design that adequately accounts for human movement
and sensory experiences as well as ethical concerns (Hopsch et al. 2014). Phenomenology offers an innovative way to
address issues of security, orientation,
climate, and beauty, especially in relation to contemporary “placeless” environments with
considerable potential for alienation.
A phenomenological approach is also valuable because spatial planning today involves large-scale digital
representation. To understand lived space, however, human beings must encounter it via bodily presence. To
gain a more thorough knowledge of this lived attunement to space, our research group used group discussion
and explorative workshops to investigate specific aspects of spatiality and movement in urban traffic space.
Participants in these workshops included researchers,
practitioners, and potential users.
In the first stage of our research, we developed
tools to identify and describe environmental qualities
that might integrate urban public transit with urban
space. These tools were used in the early planning process. Researchers and practitioners were involved in a
series of dialog seminars to understand how to identify
and notate taken-for-granted lived qualities and actions often regarded as “tacit knowledge” (Hartelo &
Mochizuki 2009; Hopsch et al. 2013).

T

he West Link Project is an eight-kilometer, double-track rail system under the center of Gothenburg. This network will connect commuter rail
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services to city mass-transit routes. In
spring, 2012, a collaboration between
The Swedish Transport Administration
and Chalmers University prepared a pilot
study of the designs for several new
West Link stations to be built as part of
the larger project [2].
This collaboration drew on the
model of a design research studio. The
aim was a “hermeneutical spiral” of progressive interpretive discovery whereby
perspectives are widened and knowledge
is deepened [3]. One result was new design methods and tools that can be used
to identify innovative spatial qualities to
strengthen environmental encounter. A
deeper knowledge of urban spatial form
in an embodied context created a starting point for
working with new aspects in the design of space for
public transportation.
This focus on sensory dimensions of the urbantransit experience provided a point of common reference that allowed participants to consider the experiential nature of transit design. Participants came to
recognize the importance of a multisensory focus, including the significance of haptic experience. Participants gained a deeper sense of empathy—in other
words, how to “feel into things” and thereby incorporate affective dimensions of transit experience.
Considering peoples’ bodily and sensory experiences of urban space contributes to designing public transport in a more user-friendly way. One central goal is contributing ideas for designing public
places with a multivalent sense of meaning. A phenomenological approach is a useful tool because it
offers new ways to map out questions and to think
in new ways. This knowledge might contribute to
urban design and planning that support urbanites’
choice of mass transit as a convenient, pleasurable
mode of travel.

M

ore broadly, this collaborative study indicated that the way human beings sensuously experience place and space can become the nucleus for interdisciplinary studies (Diaconu et al. 2011). Contemporary urban planning is a

field of interconnectedness and relations;
there is necessary a trans-disciplinary approach that bridges gaps between architecture, urban planning landscape architecture, and traffic planning.
Questions developed within a complex
context require cooperation and mutual understanding to achieve resilient results.
This process can contribute to innovative
structures that facilitate people’s choices in
transit situations and so contribute to more
sustainable urban development.

Notes
1. Because it is trans-disciplinary, this method has
practical application within collaborative efforts
such as urban design and public-transport and traffic planning. The present study is supported by the Swedish Research Counci FORMAS, in collaboration with the Swedish
Transport Administration. The broader focus of which the current work is part is “Architecture in Effect: Re-Thinking the Social in Architecture.” For a description, go to: http://architectureineffect.se/projections/project-practicies [accessed July 24,
2014].
2. For more information on the West Link Project, go to: www.trafikverket.se/Om-Trafikverket/Andra-sprak/English-Engelska/Railway-and-Road/Railway-Construction-Projects/West-Link-Project/ [accessed July 24, 2014].
3. Other programs involved in this collaborative study were Istanbul Technical University’s Department of Architecture; Mississippi State University’s School of Art and Design; and the Ecole
Nationale d'Architecture de Paris’s GERPHAU (Groupe
d’études et de recherche philosophie, architecture et urbain).
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G

oogle recently offered early adopters of its
Glass device a primer on how not to seem
“creepy or rude” while using the new technology in public. Sourced from firsthand
experiences of the company’s “Glass Explorer” members, the guide issues a warning against awkward social lapses caused by staring into the device’s prism
for extended periods of time. Digital interfaces often
induce such imperturbable trances as those in which
smartphone users already find themselves. The socialite, shopper, artist, and business executive now wear
the distrait stare of a lone video gamer, each navigating this unsteady merger of apparatus and environment.
There is a vanishing separation of these “augmented” spaces—enhanced by applications, high-resolution mobile photography, social networking, and
the instantaneity of information—from the built and
designable forms through which everyday life has
been traditionally lived. As Google acknowledges,
however, it is still an uncanny separation, continually
reasserted upon exploring and feeling out its limits,
finding us all the more prone to sudden jolts and spells
of disorientation. But the rude affectations of the
smartphone user (which may only worsen as “wearables” and devices tailored to gestural response gain
currency) are more telling of discrepancies between
the habits and norms of a changing technological culture than of any failed architectonic integration of the
virtual.
That one could now feasibly organize her life as
though the world were nothing more than a vast internet of data is a fact far from contingent upon any specific advance in visual imaging. It speaks to our imaginative submission to the virtual, even where computer graphics fall short. The dream of a “Second

Life” is after all one of escapism. There have always
been sufficient, if anemic, surrogates for the real, and
the vampiric body of the gamer, nourished in darkness
on the glimmer of televisual feeds, hardly needs convincing of this.

W

e are inclined to imagine virtual reality as a
particular kind of interface. In the most commonplace of occurrences, however, we can
find a virtuality that is not set over and against the real.
Wearing eyeglasses, for example, suggests technical
mediation of perception resulting in a refocused real
that, if anything, becomes more real to us than our unadorned vision. The glasses become in their virtuality
second nature, once the weight is no longer felt on the
bridge of our nose and the frame’s blur eventually lost,
transfigured into an extension of our face (so much so
that we feel naked without them). Limits to the apparatus nonetheless appear, as Heidegger suggests, when
things break down. With a sudden jerking of the head
or in the midst of an intimate embrace, the awkward
presence of our eyewear is reasserted.
But this does not prevent us from experiencing
clarity of sight as a property belonging to the real. We
imagine such lenses as “corrective” of our own natural
flaws in relation to a measurable standard of human
physiology. In relation to other organisms, other spectrums of light, there is no singular, correct way of seeing
the real. Is an apparatus that filters the world through a
searchable function therefore less “real” than the focusing effect of corrective eyewear?
Technology enjoins with our perceptual field in the
gestural articulation of seeing. Whether or not 3D movies or simulation technologies such as Oculus Rift—and
whatever subsequent developments may follow—offer
compelling simulacra seems beside the point. A lowresolution illusion is not necessarily less illusory than a
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high-resolution one. Since its inception, video gaming
has offered an engrossing experience, one that only
grows in its scale of filmic excitation. But, as in most
Hollywood productions, the simulacrum is less than
transformative; it is manipulative. Such feats of illusion do not therefore set out to sway us of their everyday factual existence. We already know there is something uncanny about Google Glass. Such augmentation and illusion simply exploit what we are willing to
grant them.
However immersive the means of virtual reality,
a horizon of embodied awareness endures. As with the
sleight-of-hand magician, whose illusions are most efficacious when we are complicit in their unveiling, reality vanishes only in designated blind spots. The
magic of cinema, similarly, depends upon a suspension of disbelief, a partial willingness to accept the
possibilities within frame. We can ask what it would
mean then to feel at home in technological virtuality.
But such a feeling would not correspond to those moments in which we want to be duped into believing
something that we have already differentiated from
our everyday lives.
A more apposite answer to the question of
whether a virtual world could become so “real” as to
be lived as though it were a “real” world should perhaps instead be sought in the constructed, social domain, where integrations of new technologies brush
against custom and habit. To speak of a “Twitterverse” that is both ubiquitous and seemingly nowhere
is to describe something that has face value to our natural attitude; it constitutes a “real” connective tissue
that is felt as an immediate feature of the interfaced
environment. Our vision plunges into the depths of a
glowing screen as it does the phantasms of clouds
across the sky or sunbeams piercing the forest canopy.
It is here that virtualities are rendered in aesthetic
transactions of our subjective engagement, where they
append and fulfill the anticipation of experiencing an
actual sense of place. That is, they are not merely
tricks, games, or illusions. They are, like corrective
lenses, enhancements and elaborations of our visual
field.

T

he phenomenological and logistical inseparability of technological virtuality and everyday

experience seems to parallel that of architecture and the
environment more broadly. Building does not eliminate
nature, but rather enjoins in conversation with it, speaking to its sensuous and elemental particularity while at
the same time fundamentally modifying it. Similarly,
virtuality cannot, on perceptual grounds at least, be
thought of simply in opposition to a “real” counterpart.
Each reflects the other in an intricate and ever-shifting
composite of feeling and sensation that, as a totality, no
longer obeys the logic of a finite sense of place.
At the heart of inquiring into a topology for which
Facebook or satellite imaging figure prominently, we
must turn to the contraction of global distances. Merleau-Ponty offers an instructive observation: “Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within
reach of my sight, and is marked on the map of the ‘I
can’” [1]. The question then concerns what happens
when this “I can” is multiplied and mediated by technics, when the map of reality undergoes radical spatial
distortion.
French urbanist and philosopher of acceleration
Paul Virilio recounts a discussion with his wife in which
she remarks that “what she had found most unbearable
in the Nazi occupation of France was the feeling of being cut off from the United States. At a stroke there
would be no more American magazines, no more newspapers, and above all, no more movies” [2]. Today, this
sentiment is given a far more banal expression, as
“FOMO,” or a perpetual “fear of missing out” that binds
the tangible here and now to an ever-elusive elsewhere
borne by visual media.
Merleau-Ponty’s penumbral “I can” is in such cases
tempered by an absence made present, a “that which I
cannot” in the face of infinitely manifestable possibilities. This background knowledge of negated possibility
aligns with what we might inversely call a real virtuality. The idea of the virtual hangs decisively on its temporal dimension in this regard, its sense of anticipation
and retention (a point elaborated by Bergson and later
adopted by Deleuze). “When can I see it?” one asks; the
where is implied or irrelevant.
The reality of the virtual is the extension of this “I
can,” which for the time being privileges the effects of
lighting and sight. But one can imagine other sensorial
virtualities that weigh upon our feeling of inhabiting a
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particular place. Not least of these would be the potential to administer simulated olfactory sensations. A
smelt virtually might even convey further contortions
of spatiality—the onset of some mémoire involontaire
of a long forgotten place: digital tea and biscuits from
childhood.

W

hat I am calling real virtuality is therefore
a Janus-faced description of technology
subsuming perceived orientations toward
place: society becomes not only a spectacle but an encompassing “missed connection.” No sooner is absence made present than the gestural and communicative elaboration of our bearing on the world is met
with new intensities that enter into our subjective field
of graspable and mutable potential. Real virtuality is
apprehended only in the void left behind by its disappearances, after the sights and sounds to which we
have grown accustomed are noticeably impoverished.
Conversely, the field of perception is interfaced with
endless streams of visual hyper-stimuli, the only remedy being to “space out.” This situation corresponds
with what Virilio suggests as an “overexposure” of
spatial perspective [3]. Filmic technique becomes the
organizing architectural principle of this overly illuminated landscape.
The architecture of the world is already and increasingly lived as a virtuality. Architecture has been
challenged by cinema over its mastery of lighting, of
imposing special effects upon the action that unfolds
in the street. Each of us, no longer just inhabitants of
architectural space, is the self-appointed auteur behind our unique cycloptic perspective and haphazard
mise-en-scene. We direct the spectacle of our lives
across various platforms of recording and transmitting.
Recall that it was within the confounding spectacle of cinematic violence that a movie theater gunman
killed one dozen people and injured more than twodozen others several years ago. But it is not the case
that an inability to distinguish between fiction and reality is symptomatic of this incursion of virtuality;
such a spectacle differs categorically from really believing that the magician’s lovely assistant could vanish inside of a box. And if there was a confusion of
Hollywood action and reality, it certainly does not testify to the realism of the film. Rather, it suggests a

more totalizing phenomenological symmetry between
the architect and the technologist. Reality seems more
cinematic.
The built environment, which is furnished in a
manner Heidegger might have described as “present-athand,” becomes increasingly “ready-to-hand” in its
bearing upon us. We discover a participatory sense of
its objectivity through which our desires and anxieties
are reflected back with disturbing immediacy. To this
effect, a restaurant chain has recently capitalized on
touch-screen menus in an attempt to mitigate the embarrassment of customers wanting to order gratuitous
amounts of food.
Through this hybridized, architectonic technics, we
can look across a boundless landscape. The world expands through the emissions of screens and electronic
interfaces, and our embodied relation to them acquires
a luminous quality. We can at any moment “reach”
across vast distances, moving through optical connections, nearing the speed of light.
How to coordinate a body in an environment defined by its perceptual utility more than spatiality? The
result seems to be division, disunified and strained attention spans that can no longer tolerate emptiness or
equilibrium. A new campaign for split-screen “smart”
televisions advertises the convenience of being able to
roam around a bombed-out warscape in a first-person
shooter while simultaneously keeping apprised of the
football score.
Perception must in this way increasingly answer to
demarcations of time far more than of space. Rapid successions of appearances—that is, montage—characterize our trading off of perspective. We orient ourselves
as both spectator and auteur, mastering the art of sequencing and setting our environment into motion.
Channel surfing, web browsing, news aggregation, instant messaging, and so on—these are not the activities
of a flâneur but of a gambler, an individual, suggests
Walter Benjamin, who is motivated by ecstasies of time
more than space. Whosoever is lost to the rapid ordering
of appearances and lighting effects can be set suddenly
adrift, inhabiting the perceived role of the Joker, now an
audience member, now the Dark Knight himself.

W

ith the introduction of video monitors, interfaces, and handheld or wearable devices, the
architect and technologist creep ever closer
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together. Everything is wallpapered with digital visualization. What does this mean for the designability of
an environment?
Place can now be thought out as a moment in a
sequence, as something we “check into”—a
timestamped pin-drop on a virtual map. The sequencing of space into units of time—i.e., events or posts
on a timeline feed—may force the architect to become
set designer and cinematographer in one. Meanwhile,
the city starts to resemble an airport terminal in its infrastructural layout, punctuated by wireless “hot
spots” in the subway and public device charging
docks. These amenities seek to accommodate instantaneous movement across great distances.
Here, we might return to the ungainly, unwieldy
aspect of technology. It comes as the blinding flash of
daylight upon stepping out of the theater, the impaired
conversability of the obsessive texter. But we cannot
mistake these lapses of habituation for a return to our
everyday senses. What makes virtuality real is that it
has fundamentally changed the architecture of social
reality; it does not set upon us as a Matrix-like dissimulation from the really real. We cannot, finally, leave
the cave of shadows for a Platonic light. Virtuality, as
a basic function of technology that has grown increasingly complex, is part and parcel of the naive everydayness of life. In its immediate quality, it enters into
relation with all other nodes of our perceptual field,
modifying the nature of the whole.
Neil Harbisson, a colorblind artist and the first
person to gain government recognition as a cyborg,
perhaps illustrates in an extreme way the indissolubility of real virtuality. Via an antenna embedded into his
skull, Harbisson can “hear” the sky and “listen” to his
mother’s eyes, as frequencies of light are digitally
transmitted as sound waves. “I don’t perceive my antenna as a device, I perceive it as a part of my body, I

perceive it as an organ,” he says [4]. Much as the cyborg
offers Donna Haraway an image to dissolve gender essentialism, it undercuts the assumption of any essential
unity of the real. Modes of perception are diverse, synesthetic, constellational, and always changing. To the
extent that the virtual can “substitute” the real, it is indistinguishable from cyborgism in mediating somatic
movement and perception.
The architecture of the world today is of a similarly
hybridized quality. Perhaps what is needed, then, is a
cyborg phenomenology, capable of investigating rapidly shifting perceptual fields and adapting to the body
modifications of the embodied subject. Only by thinking through the perceptual limits and horizons of the
virtual can we come to a rigorous understanding of how
to fabricate better physical and digital architecture.
Simply drawing users away from the tempest of virtuality does not remedy the disappearance of distances
any more than an occupied France could forget that feeling of being cut off from America.
The task for design might instead become one of
fulfilling, within that digital trance of the virtual, the
function architecture has always performed: to create a
sense of place and restfulness, to offer shelter from the
storm.

Notes
1. M. Merleau-Ponty. The Primacy of Perception J. M. Edie, ed.
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 2.
2. P. Virilio. War and Cinema (NY: Verso, 1989), p. 11.
3. P. Virilio. Lost Dimension (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012),
p. 30.
4. Niel Harbisson. “TEDWeekends: How a Colorblind Cyborg
‘Hears’ Color.” The Huffington Post. http://huffingtonpost.com/neil-harbisson/hearing-color-cyborgtedtalk_b_3654445.html, July 26, 2013 [accessed July 6, 2014].
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I

student and, looking into his eyes, sincerely spoke
“Trust thyself.” To the next student I said, “Every
heart vibrates to that iron string. Trust thyself. Never
imitate.” Around I went, looking each student in his or
her eyes.
This experience led, in the next few weeks, to my
sharing what I called “eye shine.” Talking about it as
a class, we were more readily able to look into each
other’s eyes and see a spirit shining within. This effort
nourished a respect and trust that led over the months
to exultant reading of poetry and the emergence of a
class shout, “My beacon fire is lit!” My sharing this
development with my fellow teachers led one to write:
“Encouraging the light within each student to shine
brighter.” A month later, we as a faculty realized that
this was our mission statement, which we weren’t even
thinking about until this sentence emerged, unasked
for and spontaneously.

n this EAP commentary, I weave some strands of
my teaching experience with some design principles advocated by architect Christopher Alexander. The fact that these related strands from different professions fit together will, I hope, contribute
to a synergy of constructive possibilities.
In The Nature of Order and his other writings, Alexander champions “incremental development” [1].
Rather than imposing a design upon a locale, he prefers to walk the site, develop a plan, and then proceed
with construction in a way that allows the site to give
feedback for identifying and modifying subsequent
steps in the construction process.
He sees this approach to design and building as
nurturing the holistic nature of life, allowing a creation
to emerge through progressive differentiation in a way
similar to babies emerging from within fertilized eggs.
The architect does not put together beforehand all the
parts of a building, which is then assembled. Instead,
he or she helps the totality of the creation to emerge.
Alexander insists there is a power and sanctity in this
organic process that increases the wholeness and life
of the completed work.
I follow a similar kind of “incremental development” in my teaching at Chrysalis Charter School, a
small, kindergarten-through-eighth-grade, scienceand-nature school in northern California that my wife
and I co-founded in 1996. In the school’s ninth year, I
was teaching literature to the school’s eighth graders.
We were reading excerpts of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s
Self-Reliance. As students read aloud from the work, I
asked them to give voice to the words, not just read
them. The students did so, with increasing energy, going round in a group circle, returning to me. I thought
that I, too, should give voice to the words and thereby
model an even more “out-thereness.” I approached a

T

his mission statement has made a tremendous
difference to our school: it defines and focuses
organizational aims in a directed, powerful
way. This result surprised me because, at my previous
employment, I had experienced hours of staff time
wasted at meetings where disparate “stakeholders”
gathered to produce a mission statement. The result
was an elegant-sounding “public-relations” document
that had no real meaning and drew away organizational energy because it referred to nothing real.
These two contrasting experiences with mission
statements mirror Alexander’s two dramatically different approaches to design and construction. Our mission statement of “encouraging the light” emerged organically over many months from what we were exploring and in response to the children who are the reason for the school.
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Some educators are dubious that Chrysalis can be
organized around “the light.” They ask, “How do you
measure the ‘light’?” These skeptics want an absolute
number similar to numerical scores on standardized
tests. If “the light” can’t be specified in this way, then
it must be subjective. At Chrysalis, however, we accept that this “light” is an objective reality. A teacher
doesn’t need absolute numbers to navigate by it. Rather, one focuses on relative changes. What things
make the “light” brighter? What things tend to make
the “light” dim? The aim is always to navigate toward
more “light.”
Frequently, I’ve had to defend our mission statement from critics. Here is a typical conversation:

N

avigating by the light brings me to another
parallel with Alexander’s work, which unfolds in a similar “subjective” way. He ex-

plains:

…. Let’s say, if I’m trying to make a modest building, what do I
do? I do consciously try to make the building move from its not
very good current state toward a state in which you’re more likely
to experience “God” in that building. And that tells me very often
what to do. It’s not just some sort of great wish, it actually tells
me, “Look, make this column bigger”…. [2].

The relative presence of “God” referred to here
obviously can’t be measured quantitatively. Rather,
like us teachers at Chrysalis, Alexander is navigating
by relative differences. For him, the question of relative life and wholeness in a design keeps reappearing
throughout the making process so that the end product
might become a slow accumulation of many smaller
decisions all moving in the same intentional direction
toward the worthy ends of appropriateness, beauty,
and belonging.

“Yes, encouraging the light sounds nice but what about the
real work of teaching the kids?”
“The real work is encouraging the light.”
“Yes, but what are you teaching them?”
“That depends on the teacher and the students.”
“But you need to teach the grade-level standards.”
“No, we are a chartered public school governed by our charter. We are exploring a different way of organizing public education.”
“But how can you assure parents that their child is receiving
all the grade-level standards?”
“Parents don’t ask. They want to see the light shining within
their child.”
“Well, how can you assure the State of California that your
students are being taught the grade-level standards?”
“By the state’s standardized tests. Our students on average
perform significantly higher than schools of similar demographics.”
“But are you teaching to the standards?”
“No, we are encouraging the light within each student to
shine brighter. And one of the ways you encourage the light is
offering each student the experience of understanding the concepts we are working with. So it is not enough to cover the material and pass a test. That does not necessarily encourage the light.
The key concern is whether the child experiences understanding.
We ‘light up’ when we understand something. That’s what we
focus on at Chrysalis. In addition, a student’s light can shines
brighter when he or she knows they are safely within a kind, gentle environment, So we spend a lot of time working to transform
the ‘unkind’ culture that kids bring from television and other
schools into a kind one. We greet students as they arrive on campus. Our ‘light shines’ when we are out in nature so we take the
students out into nature every week. Our ‘light shines’ when we
are known and honored as individuals, so we have structured the
school to have small classes that emphasize helpful feedback rather than judgmental grades.”

T

he last question I want to address here is why
moments of intuitive perception, important for
both Alexander and Chrysalis teaching, sustain
“lighting up”? What are we intuitively perceiving in
these special moments, and why do they inspire spontaneous joy? Helpful here is the work of philosopher
and science educator Henri Bortoft, who explains that
this moment of insight is:
not to be thought of as a generalization from observations, produced by abstracting from different instances something that is
common to them. If this result were the case, one would arrive at
an abstracted unity with the dead quality of a lowest common factor… In a moment of intuitive perception, the particular instance
is seen as a living manifestation of the universal [3].

About the time I read this passage, I had witnessed
just such a moment for one of my students. I had been
field-testing a science unit that used a local plant to get
elementary students interested in field biology. Part of
the unit was on how flowers develop into seed-containing fruits. One of the activities (called “forms of
the process”) asked students to collect ten specimens
of the readily found Erodium botrys (commonly
known as long beaked stork’s bill) at different stages
of flowering development and then arrange the specimens in temporal sequence.
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One student’s set of specimens was such that there
was a gap in the middle, and he could not see any
broader pattern. He had some examples of the flower’s
dropping its petals and its ovules starting to swell; he
also had some examples of the plant style growing progressively longer. But in between was a gap preventing him from seeing all his specimens as part of one,
dramatic transformation. The student was dutifully doing the activity but was frustrated because he knew he
somehow wasn’t “getting it.”
I went out to find a specimen that would fit exactly in the middle of the gap. When the student added
the specimen to his flowering sequence, a spontaneous
“WOW!” burst forth, and his face lit up. As Bortoft
explains, “In a moment of intuitive perception, the particular instance is seen as a living manifestation of the
universal” [4].

pen through direct experience. These moments of understanding are wonderful and they “light us up.” They
are the core of Alexander’s approach to understanding
and making. They are the core of our pedagogical efforts at Chrysalis.
These similarities between Chrysalis and Alexander’s work help me as a teaching professional to feel
less alone. These similarities strengthen my desire to
keep navigating “by the light.” I hope the experiences
I have described here with my Chrysalis pupils might,
in a parallel way, strengthen the desire of architects to
work in the manner explored by Alexander.

Notes
1. C. Alexander, The Nature of Order, four vols. (Berkeley, CA:
Center for Environmental Structure, 2002–05).
2. From an interview available at: www.patternlanguage.com/archives/wendykohn/wendykohninterviewedited.htm [last accessed June 24, 2014].
3. H. Bortoft, Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes: Finding a
Means for Dwelling in Nature, in D. Seamon and R.
Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijoff, 1985), p. 296.
4. Ibid.

S

o what is it about phenomenology that I think
I’ve understood, even though I would never
claim to be a phenomenologist? What I think I
understand is that there is a way of seeing that can hap.
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understand the phenomenologist’s challenge to
be that of embracing both “point of view” and
“objectivity,” which, as I see it, is also that of intellectual endeavor at its most ambitious. Let me
illustrate what I mean by these two terms, first, at the
microscale; then, at the macroscale.

perception, but of course it isn’t. By virtue of our innate ability to see also from “nowhere,” we share a
common world.
A simple experiment will show this to be true. Put
a three-dimensional model of hills, valleys, streams,
and farms on a table. Have two persons A and B stand
on opposite sides. Ask A to describe what B sees from
his side of the table and vice versa. The task will be
difficult for both, and yet both can describe with relative ease what they can see from a point high above,
even though neither has been there!

I

Microscale
What I see is always a point of view—my point of
view. What I hear, by contrast, is more circumambient
and so less subjective. What I smell is even less subjective, more “in the round,” and more a quality that
emanates from something “out there.” Heidegger, I believe, once praised the sense of smell for that reason.
The visual, being a point of view, is—as I just said—
subjective, and yet that subjectivity diminishes as the
viewer approaches the object so viewed.
I see the Washington Monument from afar. It is in
my field of vision. I dominate it. As I approach it, however, this is less and less true, until under its shadow I
feel it to be the looming presence (subject) and me a
mere speck (an object) in its shadow. Phenomenologists, eschewing objectivity, tend to emphasize the
“point of view” or the subjective. This is a mistake, for
the human experience includes both.
Point of view is from somewhere. By contrast, the
view from nowhere is from God’s position way up in
the sky, hence objective. (The terminology of “somewhere” and “nowhere” is Thomas Nagel’s.) We are capable of both. What we are not capable of or, rather,
what we are not good at is to see from someone else’s
position. Chaos would ensue if this were all there is to

Macroscale
The art of the novel peaked in the nineteenth century.
It was also in the nineteenth century that social science
and phenomenology were being established. At that
time, these three endeavors to understand human reality had much in common. The novelist strove to capture the society of the time. Madame Bovary had the
subtitle “moeurs de province.” Balzac’s La Comédie
Humaine was a monumental effort to depict life in all
its variety. The great novelists sought to be objective
by drawing attention, as would a sociologist, to the social and economic forces at work. They also provided
technical information of the sort one might find in a
manual. Thomas Hardy described how a tractor
worked and wasn’t bothered by the departure from
plot line. Herman Melville famously—or perhaps infamously—made a part of Moby Dick read like a tract
for whaling.
Also on the objective side of the ledger in the
work of a great novelist is a large, overarching theme
such as the nature of war in Tolstoy’s War and Peace,
or the nature of time in Proust’s À la recherche du
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a plan for society’s improvement. The usual plans designed by government and commercial bureaus are too
thin and abstract to serve that function adequately. On
the other hand, the poet’s or short-story writer’s work,
phenomenological in its psychological acumen but
without the broader frame that is also phenomenology’s calling, is too dense and limited to be of use
other than for a narrow purpose, such as building a
homeless shelter or an airport. A masterwork in phenomenology rises above these limitations.

temps perdu. Of course, this large, overarching theme
is the novelist’s and is, in that sense, a point of view
and subjective. But my point is that a theme so large
and inclusive is, humanly speaking, a view from nowhere, a God-like view, within which is a host of individuals, each of whom has a past, a socioeconomic
position, and a distinctive perspective.
Now, to the extent that phenomenologists engage
in “psychological description,” they are poets, shortstory writers, or novelists. Heidegger, frustrated by the
inadequacy of prose to capture human reality, resorted
to the poetry of Hölderlin, but he would have done better, be a great phenomenologist and novelist if, in a
masterwork peopled by hundreds of characters, he included a poet named Hölderlin! In the twenty-first
century, a phenomenologist-novelist might not feature
a poet in his work, but he would surely have to include,
besides bakers and car dealers, academic types such as
feminists and Marxists. In other words, the issue is not
phenomenology being critiqued by feminists and
Marxists, but rather that they appear as colorful characters in a masterwork of phenomenology.
What is the use of such a masterwork in phenomenology? The use is twofold: one that it is a mirror to
society but, then, if it is indeed such a mirror, it is also

A Theoretical Human Endeavor
Finally, just as a great realistic novel has many characters, none of whom actually existed, so a great phenomenological treatise can be deemed a work of socioeconomic and psychological realism even though it
contains individuals none of whom actually existed
but who are postulated to represent a human type or
hint at a human condition. In this sense, phenomenology is “theoretical.” Is this a fault? Not really, for this
bent toward theory and abstraction is a weakness in all
mental endeavors. Only God who knows the number
of hairs on our head is thoroughly and completely empirical.
.
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I

I

s this matter-of-fact recognition indicative of a capitulation to an instrumentalist, reductionist, and
materialistic worldview? Are we betraying the
spirit of phenomenology? Here, we must carefully
avoid rushing to an answer grounded in the claim that
phenomenologists profoundly distrust, if not reject,
the natural sciences as a means for probing phenomenological issues. This perspective began with the compelling foundational work of such thinkers as Gaston
Bachelard and Steen Rasmussen. The perspective progressively became mainstream with architectural theorist Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s insightful Architecture
and the Crisis of Modern Science [1].
These and other phenomenologically-inspired
thinkers asked how anyone can accept positivist reductionism to describe, much less pinpoint or explain, the
complex thickness of lived experience. These thinkers
claimed that, since subjective experience is inaccessible from without, it cannot be probed directly by scientific method and therefore must always remain beyond empirical measurability.
I would argue that this formulaic view of phenomenology as anti-scientific has never been true. Phenomenology began with founder Edmund Husserl’s
famous exhortation of “back to the things themselves”
in response to obscure philosophical analyses and abstractions lacking little relation to lived experience.
This “going back to things” involved a contemplative
science of sorts: the direct, unbiased observation of
first-person experience of reality and consciousness.
Husserl developed a specific method, the “phenomenological reduction,” as a way to put aside all content
of consciousness to “objectively” access what is really

n this essay, I discuss what I see as central to the
advancement of EAP in the next quarter century:
developing a sophisticated, robust phenomenological dialogue with analytic science. This dialogue is necessary because it is increasingly difficult,
if not impossible (theoretically and practically), to advance insights, observations, or allegations without offering empirical evidence.
Quite simply, rhetorical craftsmanship, logical argument, poetic writing, and impeccable credentials are
no longer enough to cement the legitimacy of research
claims. In their place, science, the source of most of
our practical knowledge and technology, has de facto
become today’s only widely agreed method to validate
arguments and hypotheses. Science is therefore a fundamental power broker in all important decisions affecting us, be they related to environmental, psychological, social, political, or economic matters.
Signs of this condition abound. The rapid rise of
evidence-based design is but one example of an accentuating trend. We can be upset and enumerate the many
problems and biases behind this state of affairs, but the
fact remains uncontestable. Instead of resisting, a more
productive path would be to think of science as another
perspective, language, and method that can be used
when considering phenomenological questions, insights, and recommendations. We teachers, professionals, and designers know this very well. If we are
to engage students, clients, and users productively, we
must speak to their concerns, in their language, using
their logic.
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present in experience. I don’t necessarily defend or
criticize Husserl’s “reduction.” Rather, I bring it forward to highlight his affinity with scientific method in
the sense of taking nothing for granted and instead
seeking to apply objective observation to subjective
psychological events [2].

enon) as gift. In this act, we may realize a transcendence of being and some mode of spiritual presence.
Philosopher Karsten Harries makes a similar point:
that reality is real precisely because it does not conform to our desires but rather resists and, sooner or
later, wins over our best attempt at subjugating it. The
phenomenological conclusion is that reality transcends
human beings. However powerful, instrumentalist science and applied technologies cannot ultimately solve
the dilemmas of human existence [7].
Perhaps what is most remarkable about these phenomenological insights is they did not lead phenomenology to radical subjectivism, relativism, or nihilism—an end for some philosophical positions such as
existentialism and post-structuralism. Nor did these
phenomenological insights lead to a rejection of science but only to the refutation of scientism, its most
simplistic representation.
Here, we ask the reason for such equanimous response. I suggest that, in their heart of hearts, phenomenologists are pragmatists. They truly want to deal
with the experience of the world as lived and to understand human being-in-the-world. They are not keen on
generating far-fetched philosophical models or adopting radical ideological positions. Given this no-nonsense attitude, phenomenologists are ready to accept
experience-based knowledge and utilize it for advancing lived reality either actively (e.g., via the design of
the built environment) or receptively (e.g., via human
interaction with that built environment).
This pragmatic attitude has been a significant part
of EAP since its beginning. The scholarship of Yi-Fu
Tuan, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Edward Relph, and
David Seamon always included references to scientific
evidence supporting their claims (e.g., in environmental psychology, gestalt psychology, anthropology, geography and sociology) [8]. Empirical evidence was
also central to Christopher Alexander and Thomas
Thiis-Evesen’s insightful observation and “cataloguing” of phenomenology-based typologies of architectural forms (pattern language and archetypes, respectively) [9]. This pragmatic attitude continues today.
For example, architectural theorists Alberto PérezGómez and Juhani Pallasmaa emphasize the claims of
neuroscience that support long-held phenomenological positions regarding human cognition, perception,

I

f phenomenology’s beginning is marked by Husserl’s aim to bring a kind of scientific sensibility
into matters of philosophy, other phenomenologists following Husserl used science as a springboard
to clarify their understandings of phenomenological
principles and conclusions.
For example, philosopher Maurice MerleauPonty criticized standard philosophy and science by
arguing that human cognition is unavoidably embodied and therefore neither purely intellectual and detached nor merely physiological and reactive. He
painted a deliciously nuanced account of our lived
world replete with sensuality, emotions, contextuality,
and concreteness [3]. Merleau-Ponty’s critique of science did not, however, mean ignoring or eliminating
it. In fact, some commentators have argued that he saw
the future of phenomenology as embracing some type
of “naturalization”—in other words, a disciplined,
skillful coupling of phenomenology and the natural
sciences [4].
Another productive conversation between science
and phenomenology is seen in the thinking of philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, who worked to demonstrate that interpretations are the only way to penetrate,
however superficially, any claim on reality [5]. Turning Husserl’s “reduction” on its head, Gadamer argued
that it is the prejudices we bring to any particular situation that make interpretation at all possible, hence the
fundamental flaw and naiveté of ordinary science
when it demands or expects “objectivity.”

O

ne can also look to the latest phenomenological criticism of modernity and the scientific
project. According to philosopher Jean-Luc
Marion, our encounter with reality transcends us at
every turn by what he calls its “saturation” [6]. He argues that the nature of an event always exceeds our
capability to make sense of it, much less to control it.
At best, we can deploy a “reduction” (in Husserl’s
sense) so that we can access the “given” (the phenom-
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embodiment, and environmental experience in general
[10].
If there is nothing new in using empirical evidence to strengthen phenomenological claims, there is
some novelty in the increasing mention of scientific
understandings in the phenomenological literature.
This development may be an indication that the natural
and social sciences are finally beginning to consider
the phenomenological critique of science that began
with Husserl’s work in the early twentieth century.

entific investigation that has steadily grown in significance in the last two decades [13]. My call to use scientific method to test phenomenological claims also
parallels efforts in “experimental philosophy” (“XPhi”), an innovative reflective practice working to examine empirically philosophical topics that have resisted scrutiny via more conventional analytical reasoning [14].
There is no reason why we cannot judiciously
bring science into phenomenological inquiry, devise
appropriate methodological adaptations and, thereby,
lead scientists into new considerations and questions
that evade them due to their quantitative training and
worldview. In fact, some successful examples of this
line of inquiry already exist. Running the risk of selfpromotion, I would like to highlight two research projects I have been successfully conducting that manage
to investigate highly qualitative claims within a scientific, empirical framework.
The first of these projects is a large survey on “Extraordinary Architectural Experiences” that seeks to
map the phenomenological nature of these transformative events. In this research, I use a very large number
of self-reported experiential accounts to validate (via
statistical analysis) otherwise unreliable first-person
accounts [15]. The second research project uses neuroscience to probe the phenomenology of contemplative spaces. Here, I employ non-invasive brain imaging (e.g., functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or
fMRI) to gauge physiologically the cerebral activity of
individuals “experiencing” contemplative environments [16].

T

o contribute to research and practice in the
twenty-first century, phenomenologists must
find ways to better authenticate their discoveries and claims [11]. How, in other words, might phenomenological research expand its typical emphasis
on smaller-scale self-observation and hermeneutics to
include empirical measurement providing more objective validation to otherwise unreliable or unverifiable
first-person accounts or relativistic qualitative interpretations?
Quantifying the qualitative dimensions of any
phenomenon may ultimately be impossible, and I am
not advocating an absolute threshold of trustworthiness (which is never really possible in a positivist
mode of research either). In this regard, the social sciences have developed a wide range of qualitative
methods to identify less tangible aspects of cultural,
educational, psychological, and related phenomena
[12].
One also notes that recent developments in neuroscience have allowed researchers to non-invasively
observe the neural correlates of mental states. Adopting the scientific method phenomenologically means
for phenomenologists to develop hypotheses, deploy
practical procedures, gather data, conduct analyses,
and produce findings that convincingly characterize
phenomena. From one point of view, the aim can be
phrased as the construction of probabilistic empirical
mappings of phenomena.
Though some phenomenologists might disagree
with this aim, I don’t think it is farfetched or phenomenologically inappropriate. One can argue that concrete steps in this direction began in the early 1980s
via the insights and leadership of Chilean scientist
Francisco Varela, among others. This effort led to the
development of neurophenomenology, an area of sci-

T

he adoption of novel, non-reductionist methods
of scientific observation and analysis should
not unsettle phenomenologists because I emphasize emphatically that my critique does not require
that more conventional phenomenological modes and
methods be forsaken. My critique does imply, however, that phenomenologists consider a more encompassing, scientifically-engaged mode of phenomenology. Just as we cannot speak of one unique paradigm
to describe all phenomena in physics (e.g., Newtonian,
quantum, and relativistic models all have their accuracies but at different space-time scales), one mode of
phenomenology cannot address the inexhaustible
realm of human being and experience.
Forcing a choice between phenomenology and
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science or the subordination of one to the other are
false options. A more comprehensive approach requires a respectful, judicious, and mutually beneficial
dialogue between phenomenology and science. Let us
do it!

of the Forum for Architecture, Culture, and Spirituality, held
in Toronto in June, 2014). In February, 2014, at the New
School of Architecture and Design in San Diego, Juhani Pallasmaa participated in a dialogue with neuroscientist Michael
Arbib. Pallasmaa was also a keynote speaker at the 2014 conference sponsored by the Academy of Neuroscience for Architecture (ANFA) and held at the Salk Institute.
11. On trustworthiness as understood phenomenologically, see,
for example, D. Seamon, A Way of Seeing People and Place:
Phenomenology in Environment-Behavior Research. In S.
Wapner, J. Demick, T. Yamamoto, and H Minami, eds., Theoretical Perspectives in Environment-Behavior Research (NY:
Plenum, 2000), pp. 157–78.
12. E.g., C. Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994); T. Black, Doing Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences (Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage, 1999); D. Amedeo, R. G. Golledge, and R. J. Stimson,
Person-Environment-Behavior Research. NY: Guilford
Press, 2009); C. Grbich, Qualitative Data Analysis (London:
Sage, 2012).
13. F. Varela, Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy
for the Hard Problem, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3
(1996): 330-349; also see A. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind:
Constructing the Conscious Brain (NY: Vintage, 2012).
14. Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, eds., Experimental Philosophy (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008).
15. J. Bermudez and B. Ro, Memory, Social Interaction and Communicability in Extraordinary Experiences of Architecture,
in C. Jarrett, K.-H. Kim and N. Senske, eds., Proceedings of
the 2013 ARCC Conference (Charlotte, NC: Univ. of North
Carolina), pp. 677–684; J. Bermudez. Empirical Aesthetics:
The Body and Emotion in Extraordinary Architectural Experiences, in P. Plowright and B. Gamper, eds., Proceedings of
the 2011 ARCC Conference (Lawrence Technology University: Detroit, MI) pp. 369–380.
16. See my lecture, Architecturally Induced Contemplative
States, delivered at the 2012 Academy of Neuroscience for
Architecture (ANFA) conference; this lecture is available at:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PalHtOrY9E4#t=21_#1 [last
accessed June 20, 2014].
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Press, 1962); G. Bachelard. The Poetics of Space (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964); A. Pérez-Gómez, Architecture and the
Crisis of Modern Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).
2. Here, some readers may object to my analogy between Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and scientific observation;
see my discussion in J. Bermudez, Non-Ordinary Architectural Phenomenologies: Non-Dualist Experiences and Husserl’s Reduction, Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology 21, 2 (2010): 11–15.
3. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (NY:
Routledge, 1962).
4. J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J.-M. Roy, eds., Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.
Press, 1999).
5. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd edn. (NY: Crossroad,
2004).
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1976); D. Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld (NY: St.
Martin's, 1979).
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1977); C. Alexander, The Timeless Way of Building (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979); T. Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in Architecture (Oslo: Norwegian Univ. Press, 1987).
10. E.g., Alberto Pérez-Gómez drew on recent neuroscience findings in a lecture he presented at the sixth annual symposium
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avid Seamon’s invitation to write something for this anniversary edition of EAP
(which I have subscribed to since it began
a quarter-century ago) led me to reflect on
books that have had a long-term influence on my
thinking about place and landscape.
I soon realized there are a handful of writings I
have often turned to because they are inspiring models
of phenomenological description. I have referred to
these works infrequently in my writing, and some may
not be familiar to EAP readers, so this invitation provides me with an opportunity to share them, if only as
brief synopses scarcely doing them justice. The fact
that none of these works are recent probably reflects
my distaste for the current tendency to look at the
world through theoretical lenses.
What I mean by phenomenological description is
broader than the philosophical method developed by
Husserl and used by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and
others. While the work of these philosophers has certainly influenced my thinking, the approaches I mention here have different, unrelated provenances. Most
make no reference to phenomenology, but I regard
them as implicitly phenomenological because they all
demonstrate ways to return to experiences of things in
themselves. They attempt, as Edward Said claimed of
humanism, to dissolve what William Blake called
“mind forg’d manacles” for the purposes of reflective
understanding. Several focus on ways of seeing, a
theme that corresponds with my interests in landscapes
and the visual properties of places. I begin with those
[1].

eyes.” He looked carefully at everything he encountered—architecture, trash, trees, clouds, mountains,
landscapes, people, and the fashions they wore. At one
point, he exclaimed, “I have spent the day just looking
and looking. It is the same in art as in life. The deeper
one penetrates, the broader grows the view.” This idea
of “clear fresh eyes’ has served me as a sort of touchstone as an unprejudiced way to study places, and the
results it has given are a basis for trusting my own
judgments and reducing dependence on the opinions
and theories of others [2].
I regard renowned critic of art and society John
Ruskin as among the very best interpreters of landscape. I recently visited an exhibition displaying some
of his thousands of detailed drawings and paintings,
many never published, all based on careful, precise observation. Apparently, he made them to help in understanding the characteristics of different types of rocks,
plants, colors, clouds, mountains, buildings, and townscapes. This understanding then informed the critical
commentaries he wrote and published.
To prepare for The Stones of Venice, a book that
influenced William Morris, Marcel Proust, Gandhi,
and many others, Ruskin had scaffolding erected in the
cathedral of San Marco so that he could draw the capital of every column as well as many other decorations
[see sketch, next page]. This exercise gave him an intense, direct knowledge of gothic architecture that enabled him, in effect, to think himself into the experiences of the people who had made what he was looking at—experiences based in deep convictions and beliefs that Ruskin claimed were instinctively expressed
in the carved decorations.
By comparison, he regarded the gothic revival architecture and manufactured products that surrounded

D

I

n 1786, as Goethe set out on a journey to Italy to
escape his problems in Weimar, he wrote in his diary that he was determined to see “with clear fresh

55
ISSN: 1083-9194

55

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 25 [2014], No.

intimate immensity” implicit in
each. Every place, no matter
how small, is simultaneously
discrete and an imagined microcosm of the world [5].
For her wonderful book,
The Ecology of Imagination in
Childhood, Edith Cobb used
autobiographical accounts of
childhood to investigate the
role of spontaneity and creative
imagination in children’s experiences of nature. What she
found was that “Experience in
childhood is never formal or
abstract. Nature for the child is
sheer sensory experience.” But
children grow up and evolve
out of nature into culture. Similarly, experience of environment turns into thought about
environment. For adults, environmental experience tends to
be a diffuse continuum of “nature-body-mind-society” [6].
Environmental or, more
specifically, geographical, experience is the theme of Eric
Dardel’s L’Homme et la Terre,
published in 1952. I discovered
this short book by chance in a
university library some 40
years ago, and, to my
knowledge, the work has rarely
been referenced by anyone else.
Dardel explores what he called
geographicality (géographicité)—the relationships and experiences that bind human beings to the earth, which
he considered to be fundamental aspects of human existence. To elaborate his ideas, he used the expressive
writings of early 20th-century regional geographers
that he filtered through his own experiences of different types of environments, including the sky, oceans,
shorelines, mountains, barren plains, cities, and city
streets. Dardel suggested that geographicality is mani-

his life in the Victorian age
as trivial and thoughtless, no
matter how precisely made.
Insofar as they revealed anything, it was a division of labor that had broken human
beings into “small crumbs
and fragments of life” [3].
I am especially intrigued
by Ruskin’s attempt, as an
art critic, to identify different
forms and functions of imagination because imagination
is a phenomenon really accessible only to phenomenological approaches. Ruskin
defined it as “the power of
seeing with a vividness that
would not have occurred to
vague memory.” He used
both his own experience as a
draftsman and his extensive
knowledge of landscape
painting to disclose three interconnected aspects of imagination, which he labelled
descriptively as associative,
contemplative, and penetrative. For Ruskin, seeing,
thinking and imagination
were faculties to be held in
balance as a way to get to the
heart of the matter [4].

W

riting a little over
a century later,
Gaston Bachelard
had the advantage of being
familiar with phenomenological methods when he explored the types of spaces “seized upon” by the imagination. “Only phenomenology,” he wrote, “can help
us to restore the subjectivity of images, and to measure
their fullness, their strength and their transubjectivity.”
His interpretive source was poetry rather than painting, and the poetic images he considered were specifically those of “felicitous space.” These images led him
to identify the imaginative functions of houses, attics,
drawers, nests, shells, corners, and what he called “the
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fest in landscape—an assemblage that “is not, in its essence, made to be looked at, but is rather an insertion
of people into the world, a place of life’s struggle, the
manifestation of our being and that of others” [7].

so far as one’s previous acquaintance with particulars
enables one to take it in.”

F

or me, these different approaches to phenomenological description share a strong family resemblance because they address the question of
how this phenomenon—be it place, landscape, buildings, space, nature, silence, imagination, being, religion, or the earth—is experienced.
These thinkers demonstrate that while there are
different ways to answer this question, they all require
the hard work of clear seeing and careful thinking.
Early in his account of his life at Walden Pond (which
I am inclined to regard as a phenomenological account
of the practice of dwelling), Thoreau wrote:

P

henomenological description can be based on a
reflective analysis of one’s own experiences,
but this method can lead to narrow subjectivity
and is, frankly, very difficult to write about. For me, it
makes better sense to try to hone skills of seeing and
observation and then to find ways to access the intersubjective experiences of others. In addition to their
own careful observations, Ruskin worked from paintings, Bachelard from poetry, Cobb from autobiographies, and Dardel from geographical essays.
In my view, however, the quintessential example
of phenomenological description based on the experiences of others is William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience, a book that probably had a substantial impact on the thinking of both Heidegger and
Wittgenstein. James wrote in the introduction that his
book is an elaboration of “the feelings, acts and experience of individual [human beings] in their solitude,
so far as they stand in relation to whatever they consider divine” [8].
James did not refer to his method as phenomenological. Instead, he called it either empirical or pragmatic, though the essence of his approach, like phenomenology, is to study direct experiences and to
avoid theoretical speculation. His writings incorporate
a survey of subjective phenomena recorded in literature by “articulate and self-conscious” people who had
no special erudition but “lie along the beaten highway.”
His descriptions of religious experience follow
what he referred to as an existential point of view that
embraces both unremarkable, everyday experiences of
faith in different religions, and also mysticism, intense
moments of conversion, and what he referred to as pathologies, exaggerations, and perversions. To grasp
the variety of religious experiences, he focussed on
particular cases and claimed, in an echo of Goethe and
Ruskin, that “One must know concrete instances first.
One can see no farther into a generalization than just

Let us settle ourselves and work and wedge our feet downward
through the mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusions and appearance... till we come to hard bottom
and rocks in place, which we can call reality and say ‘This is’ [9].

Notes
1. E. Said, Orientalism (NY: Vintage Books, 1979), p. xxii.
2. J. W. von Goethe, Italian Journey (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1970), p. 1, p. 109 [originally 1786–88]. “Clear fresh eyes” is
an apt summary of Goethe’s general approach to science and
nature, discussed in D. Seamon and A. Zajonc’s Goethe’s Way
of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature (Albany, NY: State
Univ. of New York Press, 1998).
3. J. Ruskin, “The Nature of Gothic,” in The Stones of Venice,
Volume II, Chapter VI, sections xv and xvi [1853].
4. J. Ruskin, “On Imagination,” in Modern Painters, Volume II,
Section 2 [1846]. In a later edition, Ruskin expressed misgivings about this particular interpretation but let it stand as an
example of his thinking.
5. G. Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon Press,
1969), p. xv, p. xxxiii [originally 1958].
6. E. Cobb, The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 28–29, p. 58, p. 65.
7. E. Dardel, L’Homme et La Terre (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1954), pp. 1–2, p. 12, p. 41 [my translation].
8. W. James, 1902 The Varieties of Religious Experience (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1902). Quotations are from
Lecture I and Lecture XX.
9. H. D. Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 67 [originally 1854].
Image, p. 56: John Ruskin, The South Side of the Basilica of St.
Mark’s, Venice, from the Loggia of the Doge’s Palace, c. 1851,
Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, UK, pencil and watercolor.
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What is Phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the
first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 1945, p. vii

A

century has passed since philosopher and
phenomenology founder Edmund Husserl
published Ideas. Almost 70 years have
passed since French phenomenologist
Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote the words above, and
his question continues to be answered in many different ways.
Some thinkers have interpreted phenomenology
in light of new findings in the field of neuroscience
and philosophy of mind, building new bridges between disciplines [1]. Others have taken phenomenology into the field of nursing and related health-care
fields, “helping us to grasp the ordinary, the unexpected, and the ineffable elements of human experience in health and illness” [2]. Many researchers
work in the field of environmental and architectural
phenomenology, reflecting on the meaning of place,
embodiment, building, dwelling, and home.
When I think of who has made a significant contribution to this field, David Seamon has a prominent
place on the podium, given his prolific list of publications and extraordinary contribution to the community, provided via Environmental and Architectural
Phenomenology. He received a service award from
the Environmental Research Design Association
(EDRA) in 2006, celebrating his accomplishments in
advancing phenomenological possibilities within the
field of environmental design.
I am sure that I am not the only supporter of his
work who feels that we could be providing him with

a number of additional awards as well for his long career in support of thoughtful, phenomenological research. His determination to provide a forum for phenomenological reflection is not only impressive but always inspirational.
Other contemporary writers who regularly come to
mind as key contributors to the field of environmental
and architectural phenomenology include Bob
Mugerauer; Ed Casey; Jeff Malpas; Edward Relph and,
my most recent favorite, Henri Bortoft [3]. When I think
of these researchers, I realize they have all taken the
philosophical dimensions of phenomenology and enlarged those concepts through interdisciplinary dialogue.
Such a task is no small achievement. Classic philosophical texts, not to mention dense phenomenological
works such as Heidegger’s Being and Time or MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perception, open up vistas
that are challenging to even the most sophisticated student of philosophy. Yet these thinkers I’ve highlighted
manage to take those key classic texts and build upon
them without compromising the integrity of the original
philosophical message. To my mind, in doing so, they
not only validate the mission of philosophy as “applied,” but they take phenomenology into the lived
world and truly change it for the better.
My sense is that phenomenology is applied philosophy, in the true sense of the term. As a method, it
serves to remind us of the significance of the full range
of meaning of human experience, including taken-for-
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granted assumptions, values, and perceptions often
forgotten in analytic frameworks. In attending to prethematic ways of being-in-the-world, phenomenology
helps to comprehend human behavior in its fullness.
The larger task is to find ways in which phenomenology can take that understanding and provide guidance in the actual, deliberate design of better places.
Challenges remain in terms of both revealing implicit
paradigms, values, and experiences of place, as well
as applying that knowledge to our city-building practices. There has been much accomplished since Husserl; at the same time, there is much more to be done.
That promise ensures that phenomenological work
will continue, particularly in the interdisciplinary “application” to specific urban-design challenges.
Let me end by extending my congratulations to
EAP and to David Seamon for keeping the phenomenological project on the right track for decades. May
he continue to do so for many years to come!

Notes
1. See the work of Evan Thompson, including Waking, Dreaming,
Being: New Light on the Self and Consciousness from Neuroscience, Meditation and Philosophy (NY: Columbia University
Press, 2014, forthcoming); and The Embodied Mind: Cognitive
Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1991).
2. Nursing and the Experience of Illness, I. Madyar and J. Walton,
eds. (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 1; see also P. Munhall, Revisioning Phenomenology: Nursing and Health Science Research
(London: Jones and Barlett, 1994).
3. See R. Mugerauer, Interpretations on Behalf of Place (Albany,
NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1994); E. Casey, Getting
Back into Place (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009); J.
Malpas, Place and Experience (London: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1999); E. Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion,
1976/2008); Henri Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature (Hudson,
NY: Lindesfarne Press, 1996); and Taking Appearance Seriously
(Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2013).
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S

hould I begin with an example drawn from
field notes in the life of a practicing phenomenologist? The time and place: June, 2014, in
Hildesheim, Germany [1]. Three paths:

 The path through the countryside from which one plunges
into the trees at a certain spot, unexpectedly emerging at a
small structure filled, for my German colleague Rolf, with
the memory of the sounds made by a Japanese musician
(sounds that accompanied the silence perfectly);
 The path that led us around the little lake, conversing all the
while, after our dinner with Professor Ogawa;
 The path we took more than once (and at different times of
day) between Rolf’s home and the campus.

Already, several possible experiential structures
emerge:
 Experiencing a path as a direction to a goal, even if the goal
is not known in advance to someone taking this path for the
first time;
 Experiencing a path that brings us back to where we started,
even though we continually moved forward in a single direction;
 Experiencing a path linking two places—now one is the
starting point and the other is the destination, then later in
the day they exchange roles as we travel the path in the opposite direction.

In the last case, both Rolf’s home and the places
where the seminar met (including the grassy, treesheltered space behind the building as well as “our”
room inside) work as “destinations,” each at their own
time. But neither destination is arbitrary or indifferent.
They reflect our destinies, whether the seminar group
as a whole is engaged in a collective experiment in
phenomenological practice at the university, or Rolf
and I are back home discussing phenomenology with
the help of good wine and a full moon or a summer
thunderstorm. In other words, when Rolf and I walk
the pathway between his home and the campus, this

makes sense for us because we are also fellow sojourners following a pathway of inquiry and exploration we
call “phenomenology.”

T

his lived connectedness stands out even more
clearly for me when I recall the memorable night
that five of us from five different countries gathered for dinner, an occasion not merely for some good
German beer but for outstanding camaraderie and much
laughter. On one level, we were at the restaurant in that
particular small hotel because it was where two of us
were staying as well as being “on the way” home for the
rest of us.
More profoundly, however, we were together at that
specific place and time because our life-paths had converged, coming together not only through a shared commitment to the phenomenological tradition, but through
our complementary work with the lived body, movement, and dance. With such colleagues, one can embrace at a doorway—a threshold—to say goodbye at a
time of literal, physical parting, yet remain companions
(whether for a while or for a lifetime) on the “path with
a heart.”
Here it is clear that, even though I initially set out to
describe a path as a feature of the natural and built
worlds, I find myself describing a multi-dimensional
experience in which the possibility of following a path
of phenomenological practice plays as great a role as the
bricks, gravel, and earth of the visible paths beneath our
feet. In what follows, I accordingly explore some resonances between certain experiential possibilities of
paths as elements of lived landscapes and similar structures emerging in the lived experience of phenomenology itself—or more specifically, phenomenological
method (methodos, from hodos, way, journey)—as a
path [2].
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A

s a first example, consider someone walking
along and coming to a fork in the path. This
path branches off in two directions, offering
two ways to proceed, and to go on at all, one must
make a decision (Bloomer and Moore 1977, 86). One
example of this structure in phenomenological practice involves a fundamental choice of method: Husserl’s path of description, or Heidegger’s path of interpretation? [3].
Here, it is striking that the notion of “pathway” is
often used to characterize Heidegger’s life and work
(e.g., Pöggeler 1989). Thus, it is entirely fitting that
the motto for his Gesamtausgabe—the project devoted to publishing all of his writings—speaks of
“pathways, not works” [4], especially since
Heidegger himself often refers to paths in a number of
connections. Some examples:
 He uses a particular country path of his youth as an occasion
for interpretation (1981);
 He sets a conversation in motion along a different country
path (1966);
 He draws on the word “pathmarks” as the title for one collection of essays (1998);
 In the original German title of another collection (2002), he
recovers, beneath the conventional use of the word
Holzwege to indicate being led astray (being on the wrong
track), its original meaning—paths leading into a forest or
wood.

In the last example, he uses the original understanding of Holzwege to suggest paths that simply
lead where they lead, even if the region they wander
through contains no traditionally canonized “destination.” He even links the notion of language as a “path”
or “way” (Weg) with the Tao (1971a, 92f.) and contrasts the act of traversing a path already there with
the work of clearing a way (as across a snow-covered
field) and keeping it open, bringing it forth as a path
for the first time (1971a, 129ff.).
When we set forth in the pregiven world, it is the
path itself that walks us, so to speak, requiring us to
adjust our gait with its steppingstones and stairs, inviting us to move swiftly ahead or to ramble and linger. But whether the path was originally shaped by the
erosion of stones, by animals seeking water, or by
landscape architects, it has a history, encompassing an
inaugural establishment or pathmaking; the gradual
consecration of the path through repeated use; and

perhaps a further phase in which a path no longer taken
becomes overgrown, its destination forgotten or irrelevant, the world it gathers no longer shining forth [5], for
in a Heideggerian interpretation, a path, once made,
only keeps its world alive if we hear the call of this pathway (1981).

F

or Husserl, however, what first stands out is the
need for the initial pathmaking wherever there
are no pregiven paths to guide us. On more than
one occasion, he turns to the image of the explorer of
the “trackless wilderness” of an entirely new continent
(5/154; cf. 3–1/224) [6] to describe his discovery of the
“immense fields” of investigation (20–1/303) opened
up by the new paths and directions of phenomenological
research (20–1/272, 315).
In the process, he delineates several important features of phenomenology as a pathway of inquiry:
 When we set forth on the path of phenomenological work, we
do not know in advance what the investigation will deliver
(HM8/347f.): The path proves its practicality and fruitfulness
as a way to proceed only when we actually take it (34/291).
 We necessarily proceed step by step (24/445; 20–1/273, 286;
8/169), while at the same time remaining cognizant of the
larger horizon (e.g., the concrete whole we ultimately want to
explicate), since it is what orients our progress every step of
the way (34/296) [7].
 As a result, the unity of the path consists of its being a path
toward a goal—but as Husserl tells us in the same breath, the
goal may not lie at the end of the path, but in the journey itself
(15/419).

Furthermore, Husserl’s turn to the figure of the explorer makes it clear that once a path has been made, it
becomes intersubjectively accessible. It is true that there
are many difficulties to overcome when first penetrating
into the “new world” opened up by phenomenological
practice (3–1/5)—Husserl refers in this context to “the
path of thorny investigations” (17/251; cf. 8/169) requiring “patient and constant work” (HM6/6). Once a
way has been made, however, a second explorer can follow in the footsteps of the first (20–1/325).
It is here that Husserl emphatically identifies the
task shared by both explorers and phenomenologists:
namely, the task of description (20–1/326). If one actually travels to the new land, one can remain unmoved
by criticism from geographers who never bothered to
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make the journey (5/154f.) because the explorer’s reports (like those of the phenomenologist who turns to
the phenomena themselves) are based on the firsthand
evidence of actual experience.
It is true that the observations made by both the
phenomenologist and the geographical explorer can
be incomplete so that distinctions are missed, as when
the explorer interprets what will turn out to be two different rivers as parts of one (20–1/322). But subsequent explorers traveling along the first explorer’s
path may improve the descriptions (20–1/325, 3–
1/224). And not only that: What is opened up by the
first path is a realm of inquiry where “other paths are
possible” (17/11).
or the phenomenologist, then, the “goal” is the
exploration of the entire terrain of this new
field, with the field of phenomenological work
conceived as a place where new explorers taking new
pathways will necessarily discover new features of the
landscape or reveal new aspects of features already
found (20–1/325). Eventually, once the main geographical structures of this new land have been revealed, future generations are able to walk the paths
together (cf. 1/48) and to carry out a thorough cultivation that goes beyond the initial explorer’s efforts
(5/161). In each case, what is required is not merely
knowledge “about” the goals and the methods (the
pathways to reach these goals): “we must walk the
paths themselves” (24/445).
This becomes clear when we consider various
ways in which a path can fail. For instance, we may
find our path blocked by an unsurpassable obstacle.
Then there is the case of a path that fails by leading
you away from where you wanted to go, or to alter the
example, one might be well on one’s way, only to find
out that the path is leading you toward somewhere you
really do not want to go.
What these three scenarios share, however, is that
someone was already underway on some path, and
from the standpoint of a rigorous descriptive phenomenology, a pathway can also fail to be experienced as
a pathway by not being taken. It is true that we may
recognize a formation as a “path” when we see it on a
map, but in such a context all points of the path are
given simultaneously and no direction of travel is
privileged.

F

In contrast, for situated experiencers who are not
simultaneously “here” and “there” but continually bear
their lived “here” within themselves, the experience of
actually taking a path involves being at a certain location at each moment (whether at a beginning or already
underway) and proceeding in a certain direction (even
if there is no fixed and pregiven goal or no discernible
end as long as one lives). Moreover, it is true that the
literal pathways we encounter in everyday life exist in
an already-constituted space and take measurable time
to traverse.
et if we are actually to “walk the paths themselves” (24/445), rather than merely talking or
thinking about doing so, our ongoing experience will necessarily display the most fundamental
structure governing primal temporalization, primal spatialization, and primal motility: “this/more,” as “this”
now spills over into the immediately “next” now, and as
each fresh actualization of my kinaesthetic possibilities,
of my capability for “more” movement, opens “more”
space—the immediately adjacent stretch of the path my
movement is taking (Behnke 2009, §5.1). In this way, a
path is a promise redeemed step by step, and the only
way a path can keep its promise is if we correlatively
accept its invitation and walk the path itself, following
wherever it leads.
Along the way, however, we find side paths, intersections, byways, paths that lead to other paths, signposts to distant destinations, and so on. There are also
places where pathways meet—places celebrated as special nodes of activity, interchange, and mutual enrichment and influence (cf. Alexander et al. 1977, pattern
30).
Yet this is also true of phenomenological pathways.
For me, Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology is not only a nexus where many pathways, coming
from many different directions, can meet, but an inspiration for those exploring the experiential dimension to
set forth on pathways of their own, secure in the
knowledge that there is more than one way to go about
the task.
By providing a forum for all such explorers’ reports
of their journey, EAP has become a place that is hospitable to a genuine conversation among pathways. For
decades, EAP Editor David Seamon has served as the
curator of this place of many meetings, the host of these
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lively, diverse discussions. On behalf of the community that this place has gathered, I therefore offer you,
David, our most grateful thanks.

Notes
1. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Rolf Elberfeld for inviting me
to the University of Hildesheim to share my work as part of
his series of seminars on experimental and transformative phenomenology.
2. Here, it is not possible to provide a complete phenomenology
of paths; for some starting places, see Norberg-Schulz 1971,
ch. 2; Alexander et al. 1977, patterns 30, 36, 52, 120, 121;
Bloomer and Moore 1977, ch. 8; Seamon 1979, 28, themes 4
and 14. It is likewise impossible to present a full account of
the extensive use of the figure of the “path” or “way” in Husserl and Heidegger.
3. See Delius 1952–53. Of course, the situation can be more complex, e.g., a thinker can use both methods, or other approaches,
such as Goethean phenomenology, may come into play.
4. Cf., e.g., Seamon 1979, 29: “Phenomenology is as much a process as a product ....”
5. See Heidegger 1981 on a path gathering a world; on the world
gathered by a bridge—which for Norberg-Schulz is “a particularly expressive path” (1971, 26; cf. 53f.)—see Heidegger
1971b, 152ff.
6. All references in this form refer to Husserl 1950ff., cited by
volume/page number; citations from Husserl 2001ff. follow
the same convention using the abbreviation HM.
7. Cf. Casey 1993, 278ff., on a kind of “double-tracking” where
at each stage of my journey I experience my current “here” in
relation to the “there” I’m headed for; see also Alexander et al.
1977, pattern 120, on experiencing paths in terms of intermediate goals.
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